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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. : Case No. 870304 
HANK COBB 
Defendant/Appellant 
Priority #2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Supreme Court of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 (as amended), §77-35-26(2)(a ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a jury conviction of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, entered on August 4, 1987. On 
August 19, 1987, the Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 
not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at the 
Utah State Prison. Defendant was additionally sentenced to an 
enhanced punishment for firearm use pursuant to U.C.A. §76-3-
203(1),(2) or (3), of a term not to exceed five (5) years at the 
Utah State Prison. Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution 
in the amount of $10,799.23 to the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department. The Notice of Appeal was filed with the Second 
District Court of Weber County on August 21, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 
prosecutor to show the jury gruesome and gory color photographs 
of the dead victim when the inflammatory nature and prejudicial 
effect of such photographs over-shadowed any possible probative 
value with respect to a fact in issue. 
2. The lower court committed prejudicial error in 
failing to dismiss for cause, two perspective jurors. 
3. The evidence presented by the state was insufficient to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of 
committing second degree murder. 
4. The tape recorded confession of the defendant should 
have been excluded from evidence because it was a waste of time 
and was inflammatory. 
5. The five year enhancement for using a firearm during 
the commission of a crime was imposed without a proper 
consideration of the facts, and was inappropriate considering the 
circumstances of the killing. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 20, 1987, at approximately 11:15, the Defendant, Hank 
Cobb, went to an establishment called The Billiard Parlor located 
at 1195 Wall Avenue in Ogden, Utah. The Defendant's former 
girlfriend, Miss. Ann Sant, was at the Billiard Parlor with a man 
named Lonnie Wilson. Eye witnesses stated that they saw Mr. 
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Wilson come out of the Billiard Parlor and run across the top of 
a tan car and begin fighting with the Defendant. After the two 
had been fighting for a moment, some shots were heard. 
Eyewitnesses stated that they saw the Defendant fire some shots 
into the Billiard Parlor and leave the scene. 
The Defendant was taken into custody at the Warren House 
Apartments at 1352 Canyon road in Ogden, without incident at 
about 2:20 a.m., on May 21, 1987. 
The circumstances giving rise to the shooting center in a 
relationship between Mr. Cobb, and Miss Anne Sant. At one time, 
Ann and Hank lived together. (Record at 133). Miss Sant had 
known the victim, Mr. Lonnie Wilson, for some time prior to her 
relationship with the Defendant, and in fact introduced Mr. 
Wilson to Mr. Cobb. (Record at 133). The relationship between 
Miss Sant and the Defendant was at times turbulent. 
Miss Sant and Mr. Cobb became engaged at some time in 1986, 
(Record at 102) however, in January of 1987, they broke their 
engagement, and Miss Sant moved out of the mobile home that they 
acquired together. (Record at 102) After breaking their 
engagement, the couple continued to date, until the day of the 
shooting. 
On the day of the shooting, the Defendant and Raymond Duane 
King, a friend from work, went to a barbecue at the home of Kelly 
and Terry Woodsen. (Record at 471). Terry had been married to 
Mr. Cobb's sister, after their divorce, he had remained friends 
with Hank Cobb. Mr. Cobb often visited Terry's daughters who 
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were Mr. Cobb's nieces. (Record at 470). 
While at the barbecue, Mr. Cobb received a phone call from 
Miss Sant, who broke a date that they had scheduled for the 
upcoming weekend. (Record at 130). 
After taking Mr. King home from the barbecue, Mr. Cobb went 
to Mastercuts, a beauty salon in the Ogden City Mall where Miss 
Sant worked, in order to talk with her. Upon arrival at 
Mastercuts, Mr. Cobb saw Miss Sant leave with Bonnie Wilson. 
(Record at 414). Miss Sant and Mr. Wilson went to an 
establishment called The Billiard Parlor to shoot pool and drink 
beer. (Record at 414). While at the bar Miss Sant received a 
phone call from a man identifying himself as Ricky, Ann's 
brother. However, when she answered the phone she found that it 
was Mr. Cobb, he accused her of going home that night to sleep 
with Mr. Wilson. Miss Sant replied that it was none of his 
business whom she slept with. (Record at 136). 
Later that night the Defendant drove past The Billiard 
Parlor and there saw Mr. Wilson's car parked. Mr. Cobb parked 
the vehicle he was driving and punctured Mr. Wilson's tire with a 
knife. (Record at 415). Mr. Cobb then went back to his vehicle 
and watched as Mr. Wilson came out of the bar and changed the 
tire on his car. (Record at 563). Mr. Cobb then grabbed a 
couple of nails that were in his vehicle and went back toward the 
car to put the nails under the tire of Mr. Wilson's car. (Record 
at 513). The nails were placed under the tire so that when the 
car backed out, the nails would pierce the tire. 
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Prior to approaching Mr, Wilson's car for the second time, 
the Defendant took a gun that he kept in his car and placed it in 
his waistband. (Record at 428). Although it was normal for the 
gun to be kept in the car, Mr. Cobb did not normally carry the 
gun loaded. (Record at 413). On that occasion, however, as Mr. 
Cobb testified at trial, he had planned to go to the firing range 
in Eden, Utah that night, and had loaded the gun for that reason. 
(Record at 524). Defendant further testified at trial that due 
to the lateness of the hour, and the fact that Mr. Cobb had been 
drinking prior to going to the Billiard Parlor, he decided not to 
go to the shooting range that evening. (Tr. at 433). He did not, 
however, unload the gun. 
As the Defendant approached Mr. Wilson's car, for the second 
time, he crouched and crept quietly in order to avoid detection. 
(Record at 166). At that time, there appeared to have been no 
thoughts of killing Lonnie Wilson, and Hank Cobb's intent was 
merely to place the nails under Wilson's car tire. (Record at 
427). Lonnie Wilson, after changing the tire on his car, 
suspected that the Defendant was involved and watched his car 
from the doorway of the bar. (Record at 115). When Wilson saw 
Cobb approach his car, he ran out of the bar, jumped over the top 
of his car and began wrestling with the Defendant. (Record at 
140). According to the testimony of Miss Sant, there was no gun 
brandished during the fight (Record at 142). Mr. Cobb testified 
at trial that as the two were fighting, they fell to the ground 
and the gun came out of his waistband so he grabbed for the gun 
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but Mr. Wilson grabbed Hank's hand and the gun went off. (Record 
at 189). As Lonnie fell backward after the shot, the gun went 
off again, striking Wilson a second time. Cobb then turned and 
fired two shots toward the bar, one shot struck the outside wall 
of the bar, and the other went through the open door imbedding 
itself in the south wall of the bar. 
Mr. Cobb then left the area and went to Duane King's house. 
He told Mr. King that he thought that he had just shot someone. 
(Record at 323). After talking with the Defendant, Mr. King left 
his apartment, and told his landlord to call the police and 
inform them that Mr. Cobb was in his apartment. The police 
arrived and arrested the Defendant without incident. 
In the subsequent interrogation at the police station, Mr. 
Cobb indicated that he had not gone to the Billiard Parlor with 
the intent to shoot Lonnie Wilson. (Record at 444). He also 
indicated that he had not slept much during the five or six days 
prior to the incident, because he had been on amphetamines, and 
had not been taking his Dilantin medicine, which controls his 
epilepsy. According to the testimony of Duane King, Hank Cobb 
made several comments that he was going to shoot himself, (Record 
at 300, 483) and that he wished the police officers would have 
killed him. (Record at 432). Mr. Cobb displayed much torment 
and remorse over the shooting. (Record at 299, 324). 
Trial began on July 30, 1987 and continued through the 4th 
August. At the conclusion of the voir dire of the jury, 
Defendant's counsel made challenges for cause to two potential 
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jurors; the challenges were denied. (Record at 88). Defendant, 
through the course of the trial made objections to his tape 
recorded confession being played for the jury. Defendant also 
objected to his written statement being read to the jury. Both 
of these items were admitted into evidence (Record at 588, 598) 
over the Defendant's objections. (Record 349-353, 355-356). 
The jury was allowed to view the murder scene even though 
the testimony and evidence admitted into evidence, included a 
diagram and layout of the area. (Record at 356). 
During the trial, certain inflammatory pictures of the body 
of the deceased, Lonnie Wilson, were placed into evidence over 
objection of the defendant. (Record at 349-53, 355-56). 
Following the trial, the jury came back with a verdict of 
guilty to the charge of second degree murder, a felony of the 
first degree. On August 19, 1987, Hank Cobb was sentenced to 
serve from five years to life at the Utah State Prison with an 
additional five year enhancement for using a gun in the 
commission of a crime. Mr. Cobb filed a Notice of Appeal on 
August 21, 1987, in the District Court of Weber County. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant contends that the trial Court abused its 
discretion when it allowed the admission into evidence of 
gruesome and gory photographs of the Victim's body after the 
manner of death had already been established by expert and eye 
witness testimony. Since there was no probative value in 
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admitting the photographs, the photographs should have been 
excluded from evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Counsel for Defendant was forced to use two peremptory 
challenges to jurors when the facts indicate that the two jurors 
should have been dismissed for case. There is Utah case law 
standing for the proposition that it is reversible error to force 
a party to use a peremptory challenge when the juror should have 
been dismissed for cause. 
The facts of the case indicate that it should have more been 
charged as manslaughter rather than second degree murder because 
the state has failed to prove that the defendant intended to kill 
the victim. 
The tape recorded confession of the Defendant was 
transcribed and reviewed during two days of testimony at the 
trial. The state moved to admit the tape recorded confession 
itself even though the transcribed confession had been the center 
of two days of testimony at trial. The tape recorded confession 
was unnecessary, a waste of time, and inflammatory, contrary to 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The trial court erred by granting the State's motion for a 
five year enhancement for the use of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime. The court failed to properly consider the 
circumstances surrounding the killing when it hastily sentenced 
the defendant to an extra five years for the use of a firearm 
during the commission of the crime. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO SHOW THE JURY 
GRUESOME AND GORY COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE 
DEAD VICTIM WHEN THE INFLAMMATORY NATURE 
AND PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF SUCH PHOTOGRAPHS 
OVER-SHADOWED ANY POSSIBLE PROBATIVE VALUE 
WITH RESPECT TO A FACT IN ISSUE. 
When color photographs are offered into evidence for a 
demonstration to the jury, their admissability depends upon 
whether they are relevant and probative with respect to a fact in 
issue. If the value of the evidence is substantially outweighed 
by the danger that it would prejudice the jury against the 
defendant, the otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded by 
the trial court. Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. Rule 403, Utah R. Evid., 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Whether the inflammatory nature of the color photographs is 
outweighed by their probative value with respect to a fact in 
issue is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Defendant contends that the admission of vivid color photographs 
depicting the condition of the victim's body after the chest had 
been opened in order to resuscitate the victim, were far more 
prejudicial than probative of a matter in issue. The photograph, 
(State's Exhibit 30-P, Record 346-50) graphically depicted in 
9 
gruesome detail, parts of the body where a ten inch incision had 
been made by doctors. Over defense objections on the basis of 
prejudice and lack of probativeness, the State proffered the 
photos. (Record at 350). 
The photographs should not have been shown to the jury 
because the material facts that were meant to be adduced from the 
photographs could have been established by less gruesome means 
such as the expert testimony of Dr. Todd Cameron Gray. (Record 
343-66). 
In State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968), The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed a first degree murder conviction because 
the prosecutor introduced prejudicial and gruesome photographs . 
The Court noted that while initially it is within the trial 
court's discretion to weigh the probative value of such evidence 
against its prejudicial effect, in that case, all material facts 
that could be adduced from the photos had been adequately 
established by other less prejudicial testimony and evidence 
presented by both lay and expert witnesses. 
Poe is directly on point with the case at hand. In this 
case there is a situation in which the prosecutor introduced the 
inflammatory picture knowing that it was inflammatory. Whether 
the victim was shot by the Defendant was never a fact in issue, 
and any use of pictures to prove such were unnecessary and 
prejudicial. 
In the most recent case decided on the issue of inflammatory 
photographs, State v. Lafferty, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Jan. 1988), 
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the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the standard that in order to 
introduce gruesome photographs, "we have required a showing of 
unusual probative value before it gruesome photographic 
evidence is admissible under rule 403." Id. , at 66. In the 
case at hand, there was no issue of fact established by the 
gruesome photographs that could not be established by other less 
inflammatory and prejudicial methods. Any reference to the 
picture for the purpose of showing the condition of the body was 
unnecessary since the jury was advised of the body's condition 
through the testimony of witnesses. If photographs have little 
or no utility in proving a fact in dispute, but, on the contrary 
they tend to inflame the jury, they are inadmissible. See, 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986); State v. Garcia, 663 
P.2d 60 (Utah 1983); State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979): 
State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968). 
In State v. Wells, supra, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
the use of photographs, even though not particularly gruesome, 
was improper where there was no valid evidentiary use for them. 
The Court stated: 
Because the defendant did not dispute shooting 
Dirks, and because the medical examiner testified 
that the victim died as a result of the gunshot, 
the admission of the photographs was superfluous. 
We do not condone the admission of the photographs 
in this case, since we are able to find no 
evidentiary value for the photographs other than 
the hoped-for emotional impact on the jury. 60 3 
P.2d at 813. 
Clearly the prosecutor's use of the gruesome and grotesque 
photographs in the present case served no evidentiary purpose, 
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but on the other hand, tended to inflame the emotions of the 
jury. 
The trial court's failure to prohibit the prosecution from 
misusing the gruesome and grotesque color photographs of the 
victim over the objections of defense counsel, was unequivocally 
reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
FAILING TO DISMISS FOR CAUSE, TWO PERSPECTIVE 
JURORS. 
At t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e v o i r d i r e of t h e p r o s p e c t i v e 
j u r o r s , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l moved t o c h a l l e n g e f o r c a u s e two 
p e r s p e c t i v e j u r o r s , Mrs . Joyce Lloyd and Mr. J e s s e Holden . 
(Record a t 8 8 ) . The Defendant ' s cha l l enges t o both j u r o r s were 
o v e r r u l e d . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o d i s m i s s t h e s e 
p e r s p e c t i v e j u r o r s was p r e j u d i c i a l and amounted t o r e v e r s i b l e 
e r r o r . 
The first prospective juror, Mrs. Joyce Loyd, in response to 
questions from the court stated, "I don't know anything about the 
case. However, I do know the prosecutor for the State Chris 
Davis. It's been 15 years since I saw him, but I know who he 
is." When asked by defense counsel how she came to know the 
prosecutor Mr. Davis, Mrs. Lloyd stated, "My husband was working 
in Washington, D.C., and Chris and his family moved back there 
and we were in the same church organization for a while, about a 
year." (Transcript of the jury selection and sentencing, (Tr.) 
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at p. 8). Defense counsel further questioned Mrs. Lloyd later in 
the voir dire. The following questioning occurred between 
defense counsel and the prospective juror: 
Mr. Godfrey: Okay. Mrs. Lloyd, you said that you were 
in the same ward for a while with Chris 
Davis, is that right? 
Mrs. Lloyd: That's correct. 
Mr. Godfrey: Did you — did you have any social contact 
with the Davis family? 
Mrs. Lloyd: Other than church meetings, Chris was in my 
home, I have daughters his age, and they were 
friends. 
Mr. Godfrey: He's been in your home? 
Mrs. Lloyd: Yeah. 
Mr. Godfrey: Did you ever teach him or anything or --
Mrs. Lloyd: No. 
Mr. Godfrey: -- Supervise him in any of the church 
functions? 
Mrs. Lloyd: No. 
Mr. Godfrey: Okay. How old was he at the time, do you 
remember? 
Mrs. Lloyd: Well, I remember that Karen was a senior in 
high school, Katherine was a junior, and 
Leslie was a sophomore. And he's in there 
somewhere. 
Mr. Godfrey: So --
Mr. Davis: If its any consolation, I was senior. 
Mrs. Lloyd: Okay. 
Mr. Davis: But I had contact with Karen and Kathy. 
Mr. Godfrey: What was your impression of him? 
Mrs. Lloyd: Nice kid. 
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Mr. Godfrey: Do you think knowing that he's here 
representing the state, participating in 
representing the state, do you think that in 
your — your association with him, do you 
think that would cause you any — or cause 
you to be swayed to one side or to this side 
basically? 
Mrs. Lloyd: No. No, I guess you were a nice kid when you 
were that age, too, but Its' been a long time 
since I saw him. I've had no personal 
connection with him for a long time. 
Mr. Godfrey: He could have changed? 
Mrs. Lloyd: He could ha /e changed, yeah. 
Mr. Davis: I hope not. 
Mr. Godfrey: Now, you said that your family has — some 
of your family has been in police officer 
work. Are any of them currently? 
Mrs. Lloyd: No. My uncles are way past that age and so 
is my father-in-law. 
Mr. Godfrey: Your son was when he was in the Air Force, 
but he's --
Mrs. Lloyd: He was in the Air Force. 
Mr. Godfrey: But he's been out for how long? 
Mrs. Lloyd: Five years. 
Mr. Godfrey: Do you see any problem with that? 
Mrs. Lloyd: No. 
Mr. Godfrey: The fact that your family has been in law 
enforcement? 
Mrs. Lloyd: No. Because as I said, my father-in-law 
was there before I got married, and so that's 
history. That's in the family -- family 
talking occasionally. And my uncles, I was 
so young when they were in it, it was just 
romantic, if you want to call it that, they 
had uniforms on. I didn't know anything 
about what was going on. (Tr. pp. 32-34). 
Defense counsel objected to Mrs. Lloyd's inclusion in the panel 
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at the conclusion of the voir dire of the jury, the objection was 
overruled. (Record at 88). 
Mr. Jesse Holden, the second prospective juror, was another 
case of prejudice. The following questioning occurred between the 
Judge and the perspective juror: 
Mr. Holden: As I said earlier, I'm a former police 
officer. I spent 1967 and '68 with the 
Ogden City Police Reserve, 1972 and '73 
with the City of Willard in Box Elder 
County. As far as the jury goes, I was 
the foreman at the last jury in this 
court on Monday and Tuesday in a civil 
case. As far as trying the case, I have 
very, very strong feelings about the 
taking of human life. 
The Court: But you must understand we -- It's awful 
easy to feel bad if somebody gets killed, 
but what I'm going to be asking you to 
make a decision about is responsibilities 
for it. Is there any reason why you can't 
answer these questions objectively for us? 
Mr. Holden: No. 
The Court: Okay. Next. (Tr. at p. 11). 
A further dialogue occurred between prosecutor, Mr. Daroczi 
and the witness: 
Mr. Daroczi: All right. Okay. Mr. Holden, you're 
strongly against the taking of human life. 
Mr. Holden: Yes. 
Mr. Daroczi: Now, you realize that I think most — I think 
probably everybody on the panel is of that 
mind. Does that state of mind, would that 
prejudice you against this defendant as you 
sit there? 
Mr. Holden: As I sit here this moment, no. 
Mr. Daroczi: Okay. You have an open mind to hear the 
evidence and make up your mind if you were 
picked as a juror on the evidence you hear? 
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Mr. Holden: That's correct. 
Mr. Daroczi: And you could be fair to both sides? 
Mr. Holden: I believe so. I would certainly hope so. 
(Tr. at p. 18). 
After the foregoing discussion, defense counsel began 
inquiring of the perspective juror as to his experiences as a 
police officer, and the effect such experiences may have had upon 
his ability to be an objective juror. The following dialogue 
ensued: 
Mr. Godfrey: Mr. Holden, Did you -- When you were a police 
officer, did you ever arrest anybody that you 
didn't think was guilty? 
Mr. Holden: Yes. 
Mr. Godfrey: Do you think that -- do you realize that 
there are two sides to every case, right? 
Mr. Holden: That's correct. 
Mr. Godfrey: And do you understand that the state is the 
one that has the burden to prove that the 
defendant committed this crime? 
Mr. Holden: (Mr. Holden nods.) 
Mr. Godfrey: And you understand that the state does get to 
go first with their case? 
Mr. Holden: Yes. 
Mr. Godfrey: And do you feel that you can -- even with 
your job as a former police officer and the 
fact that the state gets to go first, do you 
think you can hold off making a decision as to 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant until 
after you hear all of the evidence? 
Mr. Holden: I believe one of the charges we receive is 
that we will not choose or decide the case 
until after, and I believe I can do that, 
yes. 
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Mr. Godfrey: Do you think you can be fair? 
Mr. Holden: I think so. I should hope so. (Tr. at 35). 
At the conclusion of the voir dire of the prospective 
jurors, defense counsel challenged Mr. Holden as a prospective 
juror and the challenge was denied. (Record at p. 6). 
When the jury was picked from the prospective panel, defense 
counsel exercised two if its four peremptory challenges, on Mrs. 
Joyce Lloyd and Mr. Jesse Holden. (Record pp. 23(a), 23(b). All 
peremptory challenges were utilized by the defense. Id. 
Defendant contends that both Mrs. Lloyd and Mr. Holden should 
have been dismissed for cause under Rule 47(f)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 47(f)(6) states that a juror may 
be challenged for cause where it is shown: 
That a state of mind ex'sts on the part of the 
juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging... 
(Id.) 
It is prejudicial error to compel a party to exercise 
peremptory challenges to remove a venireman who should have been 
excused for cause. State v. Lacey, 665 p.2d 1311 (Utah 1983). 
Two cases of this Court clearly illustrate this principle. 
In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977) a prospective 
juror was a neighbor and personal friend of a witness and victim 
of a robbery. Another prospective juror was an acquaintance of a 
police officer and had a regular business relationship with the 
police officer's wife. 
This Court quoted the dialogue in which the potential jurors 
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spoke of their friendships with the victim and officer and also 
the dialogue of the court in which the jurors stated that they 
thought they could fairly judge the case even through they had 
these previous relationships. This Court reversed the conviction 
and remanded for new trial holding that the lower court erred in 
failing to release these two prospective jurors from the panel. 
This Court stated: 
A juror is not in any position to weigh the 
evidence of his friend against the evidence 
of strangers and of the defendant so as to 
strike a balance between them as the law 
requires, viz., stand indifferent between the 
state and the accused. Where there have been 
personal associations, such as the ones here; 
to remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and 
unprejudiced; runs counter to human nature. 
One cannot be deemed indifferent or impartial 
(Id. at 802) . 
In State- v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984) a perspective 
juror stated that if the evidence pointed to the defendant's not 
being guilty he could be impartial but if the evidence came near 
being close, then he would feel that the detective deserved the 
benefit of the doubt. He then stated that he had a problem with 
believing the testimony of the accused over that of the police 
officer since he felt that police officers worked hard in many 
instances their efforts were refuted in court and that often 
people are found not guilty when they should be found guilty. 
This Court noted that the perspective juror stated, "In essence, 
I would prefer not to be here." 
The facts in this case are equally strong if not stronger 
than the two cited cases. Here, Mrs. Lloyd had known mr. Davis 
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for approximately 15 years, and had frequent contact with him 
when he was in his senior year of high school. Mr. Davis had 
often visited Mrs. Lloyd's home, and he had also been a member of 
the same church congregation. 
Knowing that Mr. Davis was a member of her church, and a 
"nice kid," from her social relationship with him when he was 
younger, Mrs. Lloyd was likely to have been prejudiced toward the 
Defendant and to have believed that the prosecutor, Mr. Davis had 
the more believable case. The trial court erred by not 
dismissing Mrs Lloyd for cause, and forcing the Defendant to use 
a peremptory challenge. 
Venireman Holden was an equally serious example of the trial 
court's refusal to challenge for cause an obviously impartial 
and prejudiced potential juror. Mr. Holden stated during voir 
dire: fI I have very, very strong feelings about the taking of 
human life." (Tr. at 11). The trial court was put on notice at 
that time that Mr. Holden was either impartial and likely to be 
prejudiced, or that he wanted to avoid jury duty since he had 
served as a jury foreman the previous week in the same court in a 
civil matter. 
The efforts by the trial court to rehabilitate Mr. Holden do 
not cure the error. The trial court questioned him, 
The Court: "But you must understand we -- its 
awful easy to feel bad if somebody gets 
killed, but what I,m going to be asking 
you to make a decision about is 
responsibilities for it. Is there any 
reason you can't answer these questions 
objectively for us?" 
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Mr. Holden: No. 
The Cour t : Okay. Next. (Tr. a t 11 -12) . 
Mr. D a r o c z i , c o - c o u n s e l f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n f u r t h e r 
a t tempted t o r e h a b i l i t a t e Mr. Holden dur ing t h e fo l lowing l i n e of 
q u e s t i o n i n g : 
Mr. Darocz i : A l l r i g h t . Okay . Mr. H o l d e n , y o u ' r e 
strongly against the taking of human 
life. 
Mr. Holden: Yes 
Mr. Daroczi: Now, you realize that I think most I think 
probably everybody on the panel is of that 
mind. Does that state of mind, would that 
prejudice you against this Defendant as you 
sit there? 
Mr. Holden: As I sit here this moment, no. 
Mr. Daroczi: Okay, you have an open mind to hear the 
evidence and make up your mind if you were 
picked as a juror on the evidence you hear? 
Mr. Holden: That's correct. 
Mr. Daroczi: And you could be fair to both sides? 
Mr. Holden: I believe so. I would certainly hope so. 
Mr. Daroczi: Yeah. Have any of you taken an interest in 
law enforcement, police -- police work, other 
than we've heard now you're an ex-police 
officer? 
Mr. Holden: Yes. (Tr. at 18). 
A review of the transcript shows that Mr. Holden's responses to 
the court were only one or two words and that he obviously was 
trying to redeem herself in the eyes of the court by trying to 
cooperate. 
This Court noted in Hewitt that a statement made by a 
perspective juror that he intends to be fair and impartial loses 
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its meaning in light of other testimony or facts that suggest a 
bias. Thus, the nervous replies of the perspective juror in 
answer to the court's inquiries are hardly sufficient to negate 
the specific affirmative statements and facts illicited by 
defense counsel. 
It would have been impossible for either venireman Lloyd or 
Holden to objectively weigh the testimony of the case presented 
in the trial court, yet It would have been an easy matter for the 
lower court in a case such as this to dismiss these perspective 
jurors rather than forcing defense counsel to use two peremptory 
challenges to do so. The failure to dismiss these two 
perspective jurors for cause was clearly prejudicial and 
reversible error. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF COMMITTING 
SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
The elements of Second Degree Murder are found in §76-5-203 
of the Utah Code Annotated. A review of the record of the trial 
will clearly reveal that the Defendant did not intend to kill the 
victim when he went to the pool hall to sabotage the victim's 
car. The pistol went off during a struggle between the 
Defendant and the victim. 
Recently this Court in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d (Utah 1983) 
stated: 
Considering that question . . . (W)e review the 
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evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict of the jury. We reversed the jury 
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence so viewed is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently impalatable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime for which he was 
convicted. Id., at 444. 
See also, State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983); State v. 
McCardle, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982); State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 
(Utah 1982); State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
The Petree standard restates the Due Process requirement 
which prohibits a criminal conviction in all cases except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which a defendant is charged. Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358. 
364 (1970). 
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence on 
the charge of second degree murder to meet the above standard. 
Defendant believes that the facts of the case more closely 
warrant a charge of manslaughter and not second degree murder. 
POINT IV 
THE TAPE RECORDED CONFESSION OF THE DEFENDANT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE BECAUSE 
IT WAS A WASTE OF TIME AND WAS INFLAMMATORY. 
During cross examination the state questioned defendant 
extensively regarding a transcript of a taped confession. The 
state then moved to have the tape played for the jury Defense 
objected on the basis of Rule 403 which objection was overruled. 
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(Record at 588). 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that; 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. Rule 403, Utah R. Evid., 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) . 
After an exhausting three days of direct and cross-
examination, Mr. Daroczi attempted to play a tape recorded 
confession made by the Defendant. Defense Counsel objected to 
the motion and argued that it would be a waste of the court's 
time, and would be inflammatory in view of the fact that the jury 
had already heard most of the contents of the confession during 
the previous days of trial. The trial court erred when it ruled 
to allow the prosecution to play the tape for the jury. 
The fact that the prosecutor played the tape recorded 
confession to the jury immediately prior to the jury's 
deliberations evidences the fact that the prosecutor intended to 
inflame the minds of the jury against the Defendant prior to 
their deliberations. The trial court improperly allowed the tape 
recorded confession into evidence contrary to Rule 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
POINT V 
THE FIVE YEAR ENHANCEMENT FOR USING A FIREARM 
DURING THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME WAS IMPOSED 
WITHOUT A PROPER CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS, 
AND WAS INAPPROPRIATE CONSIDERING THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THE KILLING. 
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In cases where a firearm has been used in the commission or 
furtherance of felony, Utah law provides for enhancement of the 
sentence for an indeterminate time not to exceed five years in 
the case of a second degree felony,§ and the aforesaid enhancement 
is to be served consecutively rather than concurrently. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-203(2). 
During the sentencing, the prosecutor and the Defendant were 
about to leave when the prosecutor in what appeared to be an 
after thought, asked the court to impose a five year enhancement 
onto the Defendant's 5 to life sentence. The following exchange 
took place after the judge had sentenced the Defendant: 
Mr. Godfrey: Thank you, your Honor. 
Mr. Daroczi: Your Honor, we'd ask that the Court impose 
a five-year sentence for the use of a gun. 
The Court: The Court will sentence the -- come back. 
The Court will sentence the defendant to an 
additional five years on the --
Mr. Godfrey: Well, your Honor, we'd like to address that. 
Your Honor heard the trial, and on the one to 
five enhancement, we would ask your honor to 
sentence him to less than the five years, 
or less than the five-year enhancement. The 
trial indicated that there were some -- there 
were some mitigating circumstances involved 
in this. Mr. Cobb was under some stressful 
time. Your Honor heard all of the evidence 
on that point. There was also some 
indication that -- well, the evidence was 
clear that Mr. Cobb did not start that fight 
that evidently ended in Mr. -- Mr. Wilson's 
death. We would ask for that reason, your 
Honor, that for those reasons, that you would 
impose less than the five years. As I 
understand it, five years is the maximum 
based on very aggravating circumstances, and 
I don't think there are any in this case. 
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The Court: The Court finds that he deliberately armed 
himself for just such an eventuality. The 
court will require the five years. 
Mr. Godfrey: Well, if its' only because he has a gun, your 
Honor, I don't think that's reason enough 
under the statute. Otherwise, it would be 
just a straight five-year enhancement for use 
of a gun. 
The Court: The Court notes previous offenses involving 
violence and also a use of firearms. 
(Transcript of the sentencing at 42-43). 
From the transcript of the sentencing, it appears that very 
little thought was involved in the enhancement of Defendant's 
sentence. In light of the gravity of a five year enhancement, an 
off the cuff addition of the maximum five year enhancement under 
the circumstances of this case, clearly reaches the level of 
abuse of discretion. At a minimum, the Defendant should have an 
opportunity to have evidence presented to justify the 
enhancement. The circumstances of this killing clearly do not 
justify the maximum enhancement penalty of five years. No 
evidence was heard at the sentencing upon which to base the 
enhancement. The motion was made upon the case as it was heard 
at trial. The Judge mentioned that the Defendant has had 
previous offenses involving violence, and the use of firearms. 
However, no previous offenses were discussed at the sentencing. 
Defendant believes that the trial court abused its 
discretion in adding the maximum enhancement to his sentence in 
view of the circumstances of the case, and asks this Court to 
reject the trial court's enhancement, or in the alternative, to 
grant a rehearing on the enhancement issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments and a thorough review of 
the evidence, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse his conviction, or in the alternative to grant a new 
trial on the issues, or at least a rehearing on the issue of the 
five year enhanced sentence for the use of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime. 
ADDENDUM 
There are no rulings of the lower court, rules or other 
documents necessary for one reading this brief. A copy of the 
Reporter's transcript of the sentencing is attached. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of March, 1988 
TED K. GODFREY 
Attorney for Defe 
/ 
:/idant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, JS^MTE OF UTAH 
***** 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
HANK H. COBB, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 18.236 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLV 
FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, JUDGE, 
SITTING WITH A JURY AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 30TH DAY OF JULY 
1987 AND THE 19TH DAY OF AUGUST 1987. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
LES DAROCZI 
CHRISTOPHER G. DAVIS 
WILLIAM F. DAINES 
TED K. GODFREY 
ROBERT L. FROERER 
***** 
DEAN C. DLSEN. C. S. R. 
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I NE'E*:' 
JURY S E L E C T I O N ( J O Y C E L L O Y D AND J E S S E 
H O L D E N : P £ 
S E N T E N C I N G : 4 0 
SGDEN^UTAH JyLY^gi^iSe? ^iSO^Q^Mi 
THE CLERK: NUMBER 3, GRAY, ROGER GRAY. E'i. 
|LEATHEROW, LAMAR LEATHERQW. 
MR. DARGC2I: LEflTHEROW* 
THE CLERK: YES. 5. RtCHAN. ALBERT rlCHAN. 7. 
CAMPBELL. PAMELA CAMPBELL. 20, SMITH. EARL SMITH. Id. 
[ANDREWS. RENEEN ANDREWS. 10, BYBEE, LUCILLE BYBEE. 13, 
1ADL.EY, RICHARD HADLEY. 11, SHUPE. NANCY SHUPE. 3, BAIRIJ, 
|DALE BAIRD. £3, MCBRIDE, VENNA MCBRIDE. 8, LLOYD. JOYCE 
LLOYD. IE', HOLDEN, JESSE HOLDEN. 14, MCLENDON, REBECCA 
[MCLENDON. 1, HUNT, KIM HUNT. 13, HANSEN, KELLY HANSEN. 
THE COURT; ASK THESE JURORS TO THKE AN OATH TO TRUE 
|AMSWERS MAKE AS TO YOUR QUALIFICATIONS TO TRY THIS PARTICULAR 
CASE. WOULD YOU STAND AND TAKE SUCH AN OATH? 
THEREUPON THE CLERK SWORE THE JURY PANEL.> 
THE COURT: WE'RE GOING TO PROCEED SOMEWHAT LIKE WE 
PID BEFORE. SOME OF YOU HAVE DONE THIS BEFORE. THE FIRST 
THING THEY'RE GOING TO ASK YOU TO DO IS TO INTRODUCE 
(YOURSELVES. IN OTHER WORDS,- THEY WANT TO KNOW FIRST YOUR NAME 
AND ADDRESS, AND SECOND. THEY WANT TO KNOW THE FAMILY 
MEMBERSHIP. IN OTHER WORDS, WHO LIVES IN THE FAF1IL.Y HOME WITH 
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YOU OR WHERE YOU — WHO LIVES WITH YOU. MAYBE: YOU LIVE WITH 
|ANOTHER PERSON OR MAYBE YOU HAVE A FAMILY AND MAYBE YOU LIVE 
WITH PARENTS. THEY WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THAT. THE THIRD THING 
ITHEY WANT TO KNOW IS THE JOBS OR EMPLOYMENT OF THOSE IN THE 
HOME. SO I BELIEVE THE FIRST JUROR'S DONE THIS ONCE. WOULD 
YOU START US OFF? 
* • * * • * • * 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MRS. LLOYD: I'M JOYCE LLOYD. I LIVE AT 898 EAST 3100 
NORTH IN NORTH OGDEN. MY HUSBAND WORKS FOR THE FOREST SERVICE 
IN RESEARCH. I'M A HOUSEWIFE AND MOTHER AND WORK AS A 
TEACHER'S AIDE FOR THE WEBER SCHOOL DISTRICT. WE HAVE 11 
CHILDREN. THREE OF THEM STILL LIVING AT HOME. AND THEY'RE 
STUDENTS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. HOLDEN: I'M JESSE HOLDEN. I LIVE AT 1355 - 5TH 
STREET WITH MY WIFE OF £5 YEARS. WE HAVE FOUR: CHILDREN. TWO 
'GROWN, TWO REMAINING AT HOME. I'M A LICENSED MULTI-LI.NE 
INSURANCE AGENT WITH AN AGENCY HERE IN TOWN. AND MY WIFE IS A 
TAX EXAMINER FOR I.R. S. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
•r -*- <- -*- *-
THE COURT: GOING TO Hti^E ANOTHER TURN. THE FIRST 
THING THEY'RE GOING TO ASK IS IF YOU ALREADY KNOW SOMETHING 
ABOUT THII CASE OR IF YOU'RE ACQUAINTED WITi-i 3GME OF THE 
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PEOPLE WHO ARE GOING TO BE PARTICIPATING IN THE TRIAL. FOR 
[THAT PURPOSE, IN A FEW MINUTES I'LL BE ASKING THE LAWYERS TO 
INTRODUCE THEMSELVES AND SO FAR AS PRACTICAL TO INTRODUCE BY 
NAME ANY WITNESSES WHO MAY BE TAKING PART SO THAT YOU CAN TELL 
US IF YOU ALREADY KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THIS CASE OR — THEY 
|DON'T WANT TO KNOW WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT IT, BUT THEY JUST WANT 
TO KNOW HOW DO YOU KNOW ABOUT IT. IN OTHER WORDS, MAYBE YOU 
READ A NEWSPAPER THAT MAKES YOU REMEMBER IT. YOU CAN TELL US 
THAT, OR IF YOU TALKED WITH SOMEBODY ABOUT IT, JUST TELL US 
MHO YOU TALKED TO. SO THAT'S GOING TO BE PART OF THE 
QUESTION. BUT NOW, SO THAT YOU CAN MAYBE IDENTIFY IT, I'LL 
ITELL YOU A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE CASE. 
NOW, WHEN I TRY TO TELL YOU ABOUT THE CASE, YOU MUST 
UNDERSTAND THAT I FOUND OUT I WAS GOING TO TRY THIS CASE FOR 
CERTAIN YESTERDAY, AND I REALLY COULD BE MISTAKEN BECAUSE I 
DON'T KNOW VERY MUCH ABOUT THIS CASE. SO IF I MISUNDERSTAND 
IT, JUST GO BY THE EVIDENCE AND IGNORE ANYTHING I SAY. BUT IN 
|A GENERAL SORT OF WAY, THIS IS A CASE IN WHICH THE STATE OF 
UTAH BRINGS TWO CHARGES. THEY CHARGE THAT THE DEFENDANT SHOT 
AND KILLED ANOTHER MAN. THEY SAY THAT THE MAN — VICTIM'S 
(NAME WAS WILSON. LONNIE WILSON? 
MR. DAROCZI: LONNIE, LONNIE WILSON. 
THE COURT: THEY SAY HE WAS SHOT AND KILLED BY THE 
DEFENDANT, SO THEY'RE CHARGING WHAT THEY CALL MURDER TWO, 
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, WHICH IS A — THERE'S A — WE 
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HAVE CAPITAL MURDER. THEY DO NOT CHARGE CAPITAL MURDER HERE. 
THAT'S WHERE YOU COULD HAVE A DEATH PENALTY AND THAT, BUT THEY 
DO BRING A MURDER CHARGE WHICH COULD BE PUNISHABLE BY FIVE 
YEARS TO LIFE, NOT LESS THAN FIVE NOR MORE THAN LIFE. SO 
THAT'S THE ONE CHARGE. AND THE OTHER THEN, NEXT CHARGE IS 
THEY SAY THAT IN THE SAME GENERAL EPISODE, HE ATTEMPTED TO 
SHOOT A WOMAN, I BELIEVE HER NAME'S SANT. 
MR. DAROC2I: ANN SANT. 
THE COURT: AND THEY SAY THEY'RE BRINGING THAT — 
THEY SAY HE TRIED TO SHOOT AND KILL HER. NOW, TO THESE 
CHARGES HE'S ANSWERED WITH A NOT GUILTY PLEA WHICH IS A DENIAL 
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE THINGS, WHICH THE STATE 
IS ACCUSING HIM OF. 
YOU'LL ALSO HEAR SOME TALK ABOUT CHARGES OF THE USE OF 
GUNS. THE LEGISLATURE'S PASSED SOME LAWS THAT SAY THAT IF A 
[PERSON ATTEMPTS TO USE A GUN IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, THE 
JUDGE IS SUPPOSED TO ADD EITHER ONE YEAR OR FIVE YEARS TO THE 
SENTENCE. IT'S JUST A MECHANICAL WAY OF DISCOURAGING PEOPLE 
FROM USING GUNS. AND THE STATE IS GOING TO BE ALLEGING THAT 
THERE WAS A GUN USED IN EACH OF THOSE CRIMES, SO TO SPEAK. 
I UNDERSTAND ALL THIS IS SUPPOSED — ALLEGED TO HAVE 
(OCCURRED HERE IN WEBER COUNTY SOMEWHERE AROUND WALL AND li'TH 
STREET. THE STATE MAY INTRODUCE THE PROSECUTORS AND 
(WITNESSES. YOU CAN CORRECT ME IF YOU FEEL I ERRED. 
MR. DAROCZI: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. I'M LES DAROCZI, 
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DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY. I REPRESENT THE STATE. THIS IS CHRIS 
[DAVIS, DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY. HE'LL BE ALSO TRYING THE CASE 
WITH ME. AND DETECTIVE ALEXANDER IS THE OGDEN POLICE OFFICER 
IN CHARGE OF THIS HOMICIDE INVESTIGATION. THE WITNESSES FOR 
THE STATE WILL BE ANN SANT. ANN, WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND? AND 
[NEXT TO ANN ARE HER MOM AND DAD, BUT THEY WON'T BE WITNESSES. 
AND SOME OF THE NAMES THAT I'LL READ TO YOU WILL ALSO NOT 
|NECESSARILY APPEAR AS WITNESSES, BUT THEY ARE INVOLVED IN THE 
CASE. JUANITA FREDRICKSEN, THE DECEASED'S MOM. AND ALSO 
|WE'LL BE CALLING OFFICER SANGBERG, DETECTIVE ALEXANDER, 
OFFICER MILLER, OFFICER MILLER HERE. ALL OF THESE OFFICERS 
|ARE WITH THE OGDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT. OFFICER DRAPER, OFFICER 
JERRY SMITH, OFFICER CLIFFORD, OFFICER MCGREGOR, OFFICER KEITH 
|BRADY, RICK CHILDRESS, OFFICER RUDY VANBEEKUM, DR. TODD GRAY 
WITH THE MEDICAL EXAMINER'S OFFICE. JIM GASKILL, A 
ICRIMINALIST WITH THE WEBER STATE COLLEGE CRIME LAB. RAYMOND -
RAYMOND DWAYNE KING, PAUL SMITH, CORBIN SPENCER. AND I 
RELIEVE THAT, YES, WE HAVE ANOTHER YOUNG LADY BY THE NAME OF 
TRACY TOLES. AND WE DON'T ANTICIPATE CALLING ALL OF THESE 
WITNESSES, BUT THESE WILL BE THE NAMES MENTIONED THAT ARE 
INVOLVED IN THE CASE. 
THE COURT: DEFENSE. 
MR. GODFREY: MY NAME IS TED GODFREY. I AM WITH THE 
IPUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE. I'M ALSO WITH THE LAW FIRM OF — 
CALLED FARR, KAUFMAN, AND HAMILTON. THIS IS ROBERT FROERER. 
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HE'S ALSO AN ATTORNEY WITH THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE. SOME 
OF THE WITNESSES THAT WE INTEND TO CALL ARE — OR POSSIBLY TO 
CALL ARE PART OF THIS, THE DEFENDANT HANK COBB. PART OF HIS 
FAMILY, KELLY WOODSEN, POSSIBLY A ROOMMATE, TODD CRAWFORD. 
AND THEN POSSIBLY ANOTHER WITNESS AT THE — WHERE THIS WAS 
SUPPOSED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE NAMED MIKE KISSEL. 
THE COURT: SO THE FIRST QUESTION IS GOING TO BE IF 
YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS CASE, TELL US HOW YOU KNEW IT. 
NOT WHAT YOU KNOW. WE DON'T WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE MERITS OF 
THE CASE, BUT JUST TELL WHO YOU TALKED TO OR WHERE YOU READ IT 
OR ANYTHING OF THIS SORT, IF YOU DID. AND MAYBE YOU DON'T 
REMEMBER FOR CERTAIN WHETHER YOU EVER KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT IT 
OR NOT. WE DIDN'T — YOU CAN TELL US ABOUT THAT. 
AND THE SECOND THING THEY WANT TO KNOW IS, HAVE YOU EVER 
BEEN CLOSE TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ONE PERSON IS ALLEGED TO 
HAVE CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANOTHER ILLEGALLY. WHETHER IT WAS AN 
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT OR A CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CASE OR WHATEVER IT 
WAS, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CLOSE TO A CASE IN WHICH ONE PERSON 
WAS ACCUSED OR AT LEAST BELIEVED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
IDEATH OF ANOTHER PERSON. 
THE THIRD THING THEY WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IS SOMETHING 
ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH GUNS. TELL US WHETHER YOU OWN GUNS 
|OR MAYBE YOU'VE HAD MILITARY TRAINING WITH GUNS OR MAYBE 
YOU'RE A SPORTSMAN WITH GUNS. IN GENERAL, TELL US ABOUT YOUR 
EXPERIENCE WITH GUNS. 
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SO THEY'RE ASKING THREE THINGS: DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING OF 
THESE PEOPLE OR ANYTHING ABOUT THIS CASE. THE SOURCE OF 
KNOWLEDGE. SECOND, HAVE YOU HAD ANY EXPERIENCE WITH SO-CALLED 
[DEATH CASES. AND THIRD, DO YOU HAVE ANY EXPERIENCE WITH 
GUNS. MR. GRAY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NEXT. 
MRS. LLOYD: I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE CASE. 
HOWEVER, I DO KNOW CHRIS DAVIS. IT'S BEEN 15 YEARS SINCE I 
|SAW HIM, BUT I KNOW WHO HE IS. AND I HAVE NOT HAD ANYTHING TO 
DO WITH DEATH-RELATED CASES OR CAUSES. AND I FIRED HANDGUNS 
RIGHT AFTER I GOT MARRIED, BUT THAT'S BEEN 35 YEARS. THAT'S 
ALL. 
THE COURT: HOW DID YOU HAPPEN TO RUN INTO MR. DAVIS? 
MRS. LLOYD: MY HUSBAND WAS WORKING IN WASHINGTON, 
|D. C. , AND CHRIS AND HIS FAMILY MOVED BACK THERE AND WE WERE IN 
THE SAME CHURCH ORGANIZATION FOR A WHILE, ABOUT A YEAR. 
THE COURT: I SEE. NEXT. 
MR. HOLDEN: WHAT I KNOW ABOUT THE CASE IS WHAT I'VE 
[READ AND HEARD IN THE MEDIA. AS FAR AS THE DEATH SITUATIONS, 
I'M A FORMER POLICE OFFICER, SO WE'VE HAD — I'VE BEEN 
INVOLVED IN AUTOMOBILE TYPE SITUATIONS THERE AND ASSAULTS, NOT 
[NECESSARILY RESULTING IN DEATH. I'M A MARKSMAN WITH A .357 
MAGNUM. I ALSO OWN SEVERAL GUNS. 
THE COURT: DO YOU STILL DO POLICE WORK IN ANY WAY? 
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MR. HOLDEN: NO, I DON'T. 
THE COURT: YOU'RE NOW STRICTLY INSURANCE, THAT TYPE 
THING? 
MR. HOLDEN: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NEXT. 
MR. HOLDEN: BEFORE THE FACT RATHER THAN AFTER. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE'LL HAVE ANOTHER TURN. THE 
!FIRST THING THEY WANT TO KNOW IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU MAY 
HAVE BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH POLICEMEN OR PERSONS DOING 
THE TYPE OF WORK WHERE YOU MIGHT SAY THEY KEEP THE PEACE. 
THIS MIGHT BE A GUARD AT A GATE OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT. BUT A 
POLICEMAN OR PERSON WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENFORCING PEACEFUL 
LAW. 
THE NEXT THING THEY WANT TO KNOW IS YOUR EXPERIENCE AS A 
JUROR. SOME OF YOU HAVE TRIED A CASE LAST WEEK AND — WELL, I 
IGUESS IT'S THIS WEEK. SOME OF YOU TRIED A CASE THIS WEEK AND 
SOME OF YOU HAVE TRIED CASES BEFORE. THEY WOULD LIKE TO KNOW 
IN A GENERAL SORT OF WAY WHAT EXPERIENCE YOU'VE HAD IN 
DECIDING CASES AS A JUROR. 
THE THIRD THING THEY WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IS ANY REASON 
BEST KNOWN TO YOURSELF WHY YOU WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN TRYING 
THIS CASE FAIRLY. SOME OF YOU KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT NEWS MEDIA 
REPORTS AND THAT KIND OF THING. IN GENERAL, IF YOU'RE GOING 
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TO TRY THE CASE, YOU'D HAVE TO SET ASIDE ANY INFORMATION YOU 
|MAY HAVE HEARD FROM A NEWS MEDIA OR RUMOR OR ANYTHING OF THAT 
NATURE, AND JUST DEPEND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ANYTHING THAT'S 
IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO KNOW ABOUT THE CASE WILL PROBABLY COME OUT 
IN THE CASE, AND OTHER THINGS SHOULD BE IGNORED. OR IF YOU 
KNOW A WITNESS AND YOU REALLY THINK IT'S GOING TO INTERFERE 
WITH THE TRIAL OF THE CASE BECAUSE YOU KNOW A WITNESS, YOU CAN 
TELL US ABOUT THAT. OR MAYBE TELL US WHETHER YOU THINK IT 
WOULD OR WOULDN'T. SO THE THIRD THING IS, THAT WE'RE GOING TO 
|ASK YOU TO TALK ABOUT, IS WHETHER THERE'S ANY REASON YOU 
SHOULDN'T TRY THIS CASE. 
SO WE'LL BE TALKING ABOUT THREE THINGS: EXPERIENCE WITH 
POLICEMEN OR LAW ENFORCEMENT PEOPLE. SECOND, EXPERIENCE AS A 
pECIDING JUROR. AND THIRD, REASONS YOU SHOULD OR SHOULDN'T 
TRY THIS CASE. MR. GRAY. 
• * • » * • * * 
THE COURT: OKAY. NEXT. 
MRS. LLOYD: I HAVE TWO UNCLES AND A FATHER-IN-LAW WHO 
WERE INVOLVED IN POLICE WORK. MY TWO UNCLES WERE ALSO ON THE 
SHERIFF'S — IN THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT IN LAS VEGAS. IN THE 
'40'S AND EARLY ' 5iZ!' S, MY FATHER-IN-LAW WAS A CHIEF OF POLICE 
IN A SMALL IDAHO TOWN LONG BEFORE I EVER KNEW HIM. MY SON WAS 
IN SECURITY WORK IN THE AIR FORCE. AND THAT'S MY EXPERIENCE 
KITH THAT. I SERVED — 
THE COURT: WHAT WAS IT, EIGHT CHILDREN? 
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MRS. LLOYD: ELEVEN. 
THE COURT: ELEVEN. HOW OLD IS THIS SON"' 
MRS. LLOYD: GEE, HE WAS BORN IN I960. DOES THAT 
HELP'' I DON'T KNOW HOW OLD HE IS. HE'S NOT IN THE AIR FORCE 
NOW. 
THE COURT: DID YOU TALK TO HIM ABOUT HIS WORK'' 
MRS. LLOYD: OH, YEAH. BUT IT WAS — IT WAS KIND OF 
WHAT MY HUSBAND CALLS THE AIR FORCE'S VERSION OF THE INFANTRY 
GUARD, SO HE WAS — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MRS. LLOYD: HE'S NOT IN THE AIR FORCE NOW. I WAS ON 
JURY DUTY EARLIER THIS WEEK. AND THAT WAS MY FIRST 
EXPERIENCE, AND SO — THAT WAS A CIVIL CASE. AND I DON'T SEE 
ANY REASON WHY I WOULDN'T BE CAPABLE OF HANDLING THIS 
PARTICULAR ASSIGNMENT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. HOLDEN: AS I SAID EARLIER, I'M A FORMER POLICE 
OFFICER. I SPENT 1967 AND '68 WITH THE OGDEN CITY POLICE 
RESERVE, 1972 AND '73 WITH THE CITY OF WILLARD IN BOX ELDER 
COUNTY. AS FAR AS JURY GOES, I WAS THE FOREMAN AT THE LAST 
JURY IN THIS COURT ON MONDAY AND TUESDAY IN A CIVIL CASE. AS 
FAR AS TRYING THIS CASE, I HAVE VERY, VERY STRONG FEELINGS 
IABOUT THE TAKING OF HUMAN LIFE. 
THE COURT: BUT YOU MUST UNDERSTAND WE — IT'S AWFUL 
ICASY TO FEEL BAD IF SOMEBODY GETS KILLED, BUT WHAT I'M GOING 
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TO BE ASKING YOU TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT IS RESPONSIBILITIES 
|FOR IT. IS THERE ANY REASON YOU CAN'T ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS 
OBJECTIVELY FOR US? 
MR. HOLDEN: NO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. NEXT. 
• * • * • * * * • 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GOING TO PERMIT THE STATE TO 
(QUESTION JURORS. 
MR. DAROCZI: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MISS HANSEN, YOUR 
DAD'S FRIEND IS A POLICE OFFICER IN DENVER? 
MISS HANSEN: MY FRIEND'S DAD IS — WAS. 
MR. DAROCZI: YOUR FRIEND'S DAD. DO YOU — DID YOU — 
DO YOU TALK TO YOUR FRIEND'S DAD AT ALL ABOUT CASES? 
MISS HANSEN: NO. 
MR. DAROCZI: SO THERE DOESN'T REALLY — WOULDN'T HAVE 
ANYTHING TO DO WITH HAVING A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH A POLICE 
PFFICER? 
MISS HANSEN: (MISS HANSEN SHAKES HEAD.) 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. LET ME ASK YOU THIS AS A PANEL: 
|ARE ANY OF YOU — NOW, MRS. BYBEE, YOU INDICATED THAT YOU MAY 
NOT BE STRONG ENOUGH TO — TO STAND UP TO A MURDER TRIAL. 
|THERE WILL BE BLOOD, A COUPLE OF BULLET HOLES, THERE WILL BE — 
THERE WILL BE EVIDENCE THAT ONE OF THE SHOTS WENT RIGHT 
[THROUGH THE GROIN AREA, THROUGH THE GENITALS. DO YOU, MRS. 
BYBEE, OR ANY OF YOU FEEL THAT YOU'RE TOO SQUEAMISH TO SIT 
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THROUGH A TRIAL AND LISTEN TO THIS EVIDENCE? 
MRS. BYBEE: I REALLY DO. 
YOU COULD — 
UH-HUH. 
WOULD YOU RATHER BE EXCUSED, MRS. BYBEE? 
I WOULD. 
YOU DO REALIZE THAT YOU HAVE A DUTY AND 
AN OBLIGATION TO YOUR COMMUNITY TO SERVE — 
MRS. BYBEE: YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: — AS A JUROR? AND YOU JUST DON'T FEEL 
THAT YOU'D BE STRONG ENOUGH TO BE OBJECTIVE AND CALM ENOUGH TO 
RATIONALLY ANALYZE THE EVIDENCE AND LISTEN TO IT AS IT COMES 
OFF THE WITNESS STAND, AND WOULD BE OFFSET BY MAYBE YOUR 
EMOTIONAL CONDITION SO THAT YOU COULDN'T POSSIBLY FOCUS YOUR 
ATTENTION OBJECTIVELY ON THE EVIDENCE? DO YOU THINK THERE — 
MRS. BYBEE: WELL, I'VE NEVER HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH 
ANYTHING LIKE THIS BEFORE, AND I JUST DON'T KNOW WHETHER I 
ICOULD HANDLE IT OR NOT. 
MR. DAROCZI: WOULD YOU RATHER BE EXCUSED? 
I REALLY WOULD. 
AND IF YOU'RE SELECTED AS A JUROR — 
I WOULD DO MY VERY BEST. 
MRS. BYBEE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. BYBEE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT YOUR EMOTIONAL NATURE. DO YOU CRY AT 
SAD MOVIES, AT THE END OF A — 
YOU WOULD SERVE. LET ME ASK YOU, ASK A 
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MRS. BYBEE: SOMETIMES. 
MR. DAROCZI: THAT'S NOT UNUSUAL? 
MRS. BYBEE: NO, THAT'S NOT UNUSUAL. I THINK A LOT OF 
PEOPLE DO. 
MR. DAROCZI: DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD BE AGITATED TO THE 
POINT THAT YOU COULDN'T POSSIBLY — THAT MAYBE YOU COULDN'T 
CONCENTRATE FULLY AND EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE AS YOU HEAR IT 
FROM THE WITNESS STAND? 
MRS. BYBEE: I DON'T THINK I WOULD BE THAT EMOTIONAL. 
MR. DAROCZI: YOU DON'T THINK SO. VOU WOULDN'T BE 
jBREAKING DOWN AND CRYING — 
MRS. BYBEE: I DOUBT IT. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. ANY OF YOU — ANY OF 
THE OTHERS HAVE ANY COMMENTS ALONG THAT LINE? WOULD YOU 
RATHER NOT SIT THROUGH A CASE LIKE THIS 0 AND LET ME ASK YOU A 
RELATED QUESTION. WOULD THIS BE A HARDSHIP FOR ANY OF YOU TO 
|SIT THROUGH A TWO, THREE, MAYBE A FOUR-DAY TRIAL0 THIS WILL 
POSSIBLY GO INTO NEXT WEEK, MONDAY. IT WOULDN'T BE AN EXTREME 
HARDSHIP FOR ANY OF YOU TO SPEND THE TIME HERE AS JURORS0 
OKAY. MR. HADLEY, YOU KNOW SEVERAL POLICE OFFICERS. DO YOU 
IDISCUSS CASES WITH THEM? 
MR. HADLEY: NO. NO, I — NO. WELL, LIKE I KNOW RON 
VANBEEKUM. HE LIVES IN OUR AREA. AND I'VE BEEN TO SOME 
(PARTIES WITH HIM AND THINGS, BUT I DON'T RECALL EVER TALKING 
SHOP WITH A POLICEMAN. 
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MR. DAROCZI: NOW, YOUR ASSOCIATION, THE NATURE OF YOUR 
[ASSOCIATION WITH POLICE OFFICERS, DOES THAT MAYBE PUT YOU IN A 
FRAME OF MIND THAT YOU WOULD — YOU WOULD BE PULLING FOR THE 
POLICE OFFICERS AND YOU WOULD GIVE MORE CREDENCE TO THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE POLICE OFFICERS THAN THE OTHER WITNESSES 0 
WOULD THIS PREJUDICE YOU IN FAVOR OF THE STATE AND IN FAVOR OF 
THE POLICE OFFICERS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT JUST BY NATURE 
OF YOUR ASSOCIATION WITH THESE POLICE OFFICERS^ 
MR. HADLEY: THE NATURE OF MY POSITION IS IN SUPPORT 
OF THE AIR FORCE, IN THE MUNITIONS WORLD, SO BASICALLV WHAT WE 
DO IS WE PROVIDE THE WEAPONS AND THE STORAGE AND HANDLING AND 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF WEAPONS TO THE SECURITY POLICE. SO 
WE REALLY DON'T GET INTO THE WORKINGS OF SECURITY POLICE OTHER 
THAN PROVIDING THE WEAPONS FOR THEM TO DO THEIR JOBS. 
MR. DAROCZI: SO DO YOU THINK YOU'D BE AN IMPARTIAL 
JUROR IF YOU WERE PICKED AND YOU COULD ANALYZE THE EVIDENCE 
AND WEIGH IT IN FAIRNESS TO BOTH SIDES^ 
MR. HADLEY: I THINK I COULD. 
MR. DAROCZI: LET ME ASK YOU THIS: DO YOU AS YOU SIT 
THERE, HAVE YOU ALREADY MADE UP YOUR MIND THAT THIS DEFENDANT 
SEATED HERE IS GUILTY WITHOUT HAVING HEARD THE EVIDENCE*1 
MR. HADLEY: I — 
MR. DAROCZI: OR THAT HE WOULDN'T — OR ELSE HE 
WOULDN'T BE H E R E 1 
MR. HADLEY: I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS CASE. I 
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USUALLY READ THE PAPER PRETTY WELL, BUT THIS IS ONE CASE I 
DIDN'T EVEN READ ANYTHING ABOUT. 
MR. DAROCZI: I UNDERSTAND SOME PEOPLE MIGHT FEEL THAT, 
|LOOK, IF A PERSON DIDN'T — WAS INNOCENT, HE WOULDN'T BE — HE 
WOULDN'T BE SITTING HERE IN THE COURTROOM. ARE YOU OF THAT 
IMIND? 
MR. HADLEY: NO. I'VE LEARNED THAT JUST BECAUSE 
SOMEBODY TELLS YOU SOMETHING, IT ISN'T NECESSARILY — YOU 
[KNOW, YOU HAVE TO MAKE JUDGMENTS ON YOUR OWN. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. THERE IS A PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT 
[SAYS — THAT PROVIDES AN ACCUSED THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
AND A FAIR TRIAL. DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT? 
MRS, HADLEY: YES, I DO. 
MR. DAROCZI: THAT AS HE SITS HERE AND IF YOU HAVEN'T 
[HEARD ANY OF THE EVIDENCE, HE'S PRESUMED TO BE INNOCENT UNTIL 
HE'S PROVEN OTHERWISE. DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT? 
MR. HADLEY: YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: AND YOU THINK YOU'RE A FAIR-MINDED ENOUGH 
[PERSON TO SIT IN THIS CASE? 
MR. HADLEY: I HOPE I AM. 
MR. DAROCZI: YOU'RE NOT PULLING FOR EITHER SIDE AS YOU 
IS IT THERE? 
MR. HADLEY: RIGHT NOW, I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT 
THE CASE — 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. 
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MR. HADLEY: — AND SO I COULDN'T — 
MR. DAROCZI: YOU'RE NOT PREDISPOSED TO — 
MR. HADLEY: I HAVE — NO. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. ARE ANY OF YOU PREDISPOSED TOWARDS 
EITHER SIDE? MRS. MCLENDON, TOM CRAWFORD ~ LET'S SEE, I 
[UNDERSTAND HE WAS LIVING WITH THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE 
SHOOTING. 
MRS. MCLENDON: I DON'T KNOW. 
MR. DAROCZI: HOW DO YOU — HOW WELL DO YOU KNOW TOM 
CRAWFORD? 
MRS. MCLENDON: LIKE I SAID, I WORKED WITH HIM A LITTLE 
OVER A YEAR AGO IN THE SAME AREA. 
MR. DAROCZI: HOW CLOSE WAS YOUR ASSOCIATION WITH HIM? 
MRS. MCLENDON: HE WAS MY LEADMAN. 
MR. DAROCZI: HE WAS YOUR LEADMAN, SO YOU — YOU HAD NO 
CONTACT OTHER THAN JUST SAYING HELLO AND GOOD-BYE? 
MRS. MCLENDON: YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: DID YOU EVER SOCIALIZE WITH HIM? 
MRS. MCLENDON: NO. 
MR. DAROCZI: DID YOU SEE HIM OUTSIDE OF WORK AT ALL? 
MRS. MCLENDON: NO. JUST BY CHANCE MAYBE. 
MR. DAROCZI: DID YOU GET ALONG WITH HIM? DID YOU LIKE 
HIM? 
MRS. MCLENDON: YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. AND IF HE TESTIFIES HERE, WOULD 
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YOU BE INCLINED TO BE PREJUDICED TOWARDS HIS TESTIMONY? 
MRS. MCLENDON: THAT'S HARD TO SAY. I DON'T KNOW WHAT 
HIS TESTIMONY WOULD BE. 
MR. DAROCZI: WELL, I UNDERSTAND, BUT FROM YOUR 
KNOWLEDGE OF HIM, MAYBE IS IT YOUR OPINION THAT HE COULDN'T — 
HE COULDN'T TELL A FALSEHOOD? 
MRS. MCLENDON: I DOfl'T KNOW HIM THAT WELL. 
MR. DAROCZI: ALL RIGHT. OKAY. MR. HOLDEN, YOU'RE 
STRONGLY AGAINST THE TAKING OF HUMAN LIFE. 
MR. HOLDEN: YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: NOW, YOU REALIZE THAT I THINK MOST — I 
THINK PROBABLY EVERYBODY ON THE PANEL 13 OF THAT MIND. DOES 
|THAT STATE OF MIND, WOULD THAT PREJUDICE YOU AGAINST THIS 
DEFENDANT AS YOU SIT THERE? 
MR. HOLDEN: AS I SIT HERE THIS MOMENT, NO. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. YOU HAVE AN OPEN MIND TO HEAR THE 
EVIDENCE AND MAKE UP YOUR MIND IF YOU WERE PICKED AS A JUROR 
ON THE EVIDENCE YOU HEAR? 
MR. HOLDEN: THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. DAROCZI: AND YOU COULD BE FAIR TO BOTH SIDES? 
MR. HOLDEN: I BELIEVE SO. I WOULD CERTAINLY HOPE SO. 
MR. DAROCZI: YEAH. HAVE ANY OF YOU TAKEN AN INTEREST 
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, POLICE — POLICE WORK, OTHER THAN WE'VE 
HEARD NOW YOU'RE AN EX-POLICE OFFICER? 
MR. HOLDEN: YES. 
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MR. DAROCZI: MR. HOLDEN, AND WE'VE HEARD MR. HADLEY'S 
CONNECTION WITH POLICE. HAVE ANY OF YOU TAKEN AN INTEREST IN 
POLICE WORK, LAW ENFORCEMENT, MAYBE LAW, YOU'VE TAKEN SEVERAL 
COURSES? MRS. SHUPE? 
MRS. SHUPE: YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
NEAR HIM? 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
MRS. SHUPE: 
MR. DAROCZI: 
DO YOU KNOW OFFICER MILLER? 
YES, I DO. 
DO YOU DISCUSS CASES WITH HIM? 
NO. 
NEVER DISCUSS HIS WORK? 
NO. 
OKAV. HOW DO YOU KNOW HIM? 
I USED TO LIVE BY HIM. 
OKAY. HOW LONG"* 
HOW LONG AGO? 
HOW LONG AGO. AND HOW LONG DID YOU LIVE 
TWO YEARS. 
TWO YEARS AGO, AND HOW LONG DID YOU — 
FOUR YEARS. 
WERE YOU NEIGHBORS'1 
FOUR YEARS. 
FOUR YEARS? 
UH-HUH. 
NOW, HE TAKES PICTURES AND OTHER THINGS, 
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WORKS I N THE CRIME LAB OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT — 
MRS. SHUPE: YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: — DO YOU KNOW THAT? 
MRS. SHUPE: NO. 
MR. DAROCZI: YOU DIDN'T EVEN KNOW THAT? 
MRS. SHUPE: NO. 
MR. DAROCZI: SO THAT ASSOCIATION WOULDN'T HAVE TO DO 
WITH THIS CASE AT ALL? 
MRS. SHUPE: NO. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. YOU COULD BE A FAIR AND OPEN-
MINDED JUROR IN THIS CASE? 
MRS. SHUPE: I COULD — FEEL LIKE I COULD, YES. 
MR. DAROCZI: DO ANY OF YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU 
|ADVOCATED IN THE PAST LAWS AGAINST HANDGUNS, WEAPONS? HAVE 
ANY OF YOU TAKEN A STRONG STAND? NOW, THIS YOUNG MAN IS — 
THE DEFENDANT IS £8, £3 YEARS OLD. HE'S QUITE A YOUNG MAN. 
DO ANY OF YOU AS YOU SIT THERE FEEL THAT BECAUSE OF HIS YOUNG 
|AGE, YOU WOULD BE SWAYED BY SYMPATHY OR FEELINGS OF PITY 
TOWARD HIM TO THE POINT THAT IT WOULD INTERFERE WITH VOUR 
IBEING FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURORS TO BOTH SIDES? SOME OF YOU 
ARE OLD ENOUGH TO HAVE HIM AS A SON AND YOU HAVE SONS AS OLD 
|AS HE IS OR LIKE HE IS. DO ANY OF YOU FEEL THAT BECAUSE OF 
YOUR MAKE-UP, EMOTIONAL MAKE-UP, YOUR NATURE, YOU WOULD BE 
ISWAYED BY PITY AND COMPASSION REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWED TO THE POINT THAT IT WOULD INTERFERE WITH YOUR 
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OBJECTIVE DELIBERATIONS IN THE JURY ROOM? MRS. ANDREWS: 
MRS. ANDREWS: Y E S . NO — 
MR. DAROCZI: YOUR SON'S OLD ENOUGH TO — 
MRS. ANDREWS: YES, I HAVE. 
MR. DAROCZI: YOU DO. YOU DO ALL REALIZE THAT 
SYMPATHY, PITY, SHOULD NOT ENTER THE DELIBERATIONS OF A JURY, 
THAT YOU SHOULD BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE ABOUT THE 
EVIDENCE YOU HEAR FROM THE WITNESS STAND. NOW, WHAT ABOUT THE 
FACT THAT IF YOU CONVICT A YOUNG MAN SUCH AS THE DEFENDANT, 
AND IF HE GOES TO PRISON, DO ANY OF YOU FEEL THAT — THAT A 
PRISON SENTENCE FOR A YOUNG MAN WOULD BE SUCH THAT HE WOULD 
COME OUT EVEN WORSE THAN HE IS NOW, THAT IT WOULD BE A 
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE IN AND OF ITSELF? ANY OF YOU FEEL THAT 
WAY? YOU DO REALIZE THAT A SENTENCE A DEFENDANT MIGHT RECEIVE 
REALLY DOES NOT AND SHOULD NOT ENTER YOUR DELIBERATIONS IN THE 
JURY ROOM, BUT IT'S UP TO THE JUDGE, IF YOU CONVICT A MAN, 
IT'S UP TO THE JUDGE TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE. AND THEY CAN RANGE 
FROM SUSPENDED SENTENCE UP TO PRISON? OKAY. YOU FEEL AN 
OBLIGATION TO BE FAIR TO BOTH SIDES, AND I REALIZE THAT YOU 
IPROBABLY FEEL AN OBLIGATION TO THE DEFENDANT TO BE FAIR. GIVE 
HIM A FAIR HEARING, HE'S ENTITLED TO A FAIR TRIAL. DO YOU 
|FEEL THAT YOU CAN BE CLEAR AND OBJECTIVE TO THE STATE AS WELL? 
ARE ALL OF YOU OF SUCH A STATE OF MIND THAT IF THE FACTS 
[PROVED THE GUILT OF THIS DEFENDANT, YOU CAN RETURN A VERDICT 
OF GUILTY? THERE MAY BE SOME — AND FROM TIME TO TIME WE HAVE 
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THAT SITUATION WHERE BECAUSE OF A RELIGIOUS OR PHILOSOPHICAL 
CONVICTION, A JUROR COULD NOT RETURN A VERDICT OF GUILTY 
REGARDLESS OF THE — OF WHAT THE FACTS SHOWED. NONE OF YOU 
HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT? THE FIREARM IN THIS CASE THAT 
WE'LL PRODUCE FOR YOU IS A .38 SPECIAL. ANY OF YOU HAVE .38 
SPECIAL HANDGUNS'1 NONE OF YOU, NOT A ONE OF YOU. OKAY. AND 
ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH HOLLOW POINT — ANY OF YOU FAMILIAR WIrH 
(HOLLOW POINT BULLETS'1 YOU — AND LET'S SEE, HOLLOW POINTS, 
OKAY. I THINK MOST OF YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH HOLLOW POINTS. 
|WHAT ABOUT THE BILLIARD PARLOR0 A BEER HALL, POOL HALL, 
LOCATED AT 12TH AND WALL NEXT TO TUNEX, I BELIEVE. JUST — 
|ARE YOU — 
MRS. SHUPE: I'VE JUST DONE DEPOSITS FOR THEM IS ALL. 
I DON'T KNOW THEM PERSONALLY. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. YOU DON'T KNOW WHERE IT IS° 
MRS. SHUPE: UN-UNH. BASICALLY, BUT I DON'T KNOW THE 
PEOPLE WHO OWN IT OR HAVE NEVER BEEN THERE. 
MR. DAROCZI: YOU DON'T FREQUENT THERE TO PLAY POOL0 
YOU, SIR. 
MR. HOLDEN: I KNOW WHERE IT IS. I DON'T FREQUENT IT, 
THOUGH. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. THERE WILL BE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE 
WARREN HOUSE DURING THIS CASE. WARREN HOUSE APARTMENTS ARE 
lLOCATED AT i£.TH AND CANYON ROAD. LET'S SEE, ll'TH AND HARRISON 
WHERE — AS YOU GO UP THE CANYON, AND HARRISON. THERE'S A 
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CLUSTER OF APARTMENT BUILDINGS. ANY OF YOU — ANY OF YOU LIVE 
THERE? 
MRS. LLOYD: I DON'T LIVE THERE, BUT MY HUSBAND DID 
FOR ABOUT THE FIRST TWO MONTHS, HE CAME — HE MOVED OUT HERE 
BEFORE WE DID, AND THAT'S WHERE HE STAYED. 
MR. DAROCZI: OKAY. ARE THERE ANY OF YOU WHO WOULD 
RATHER NOT SERVE, NOT FOR ANY REASON OTHER THAN YOU JUST DON'T 
WANT TO, TELL US WHAT THE — YOU WOULD RATHER NOT SERVE AS A 
JUROR? THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
THE COURT: DEFENSE: 
MR. GODFREY: MR. GRAY AND MR. LEATHEROW, YOU SAID THAT 
YOU HAVE READ SOMETHING IN THE PAPER ABOUT THIS CASE. DO YOU 
THINK THAT WHAT YOU'VE READ IN THE PAPER WOULD — HAS CAUSED 
YOU TO ALREADY TO HAVE SOMEWHAT OF AN IDEA OF WHETHER THE 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY? 
MR. LEATHEROW: NO. 
MR. GODFREY: EITHER WAY? 
MR. LEATHEROW: NO. 
MR. GODFREY: YOU FEEL THAT IF — IF WHAT WAS INCLUDED 
IN THE PAPER OR THAT IF THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE PAPER WAS 
WRONG IN WHAT IT REPORTED, THAT YOU COULD RETURN A VERDICT 
CONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE EVIDENCE DID SHOW? BOTH OF YOU? 
MR. LEATHEROW: (MR. LEATHEROW NODS.) 
MR. GODFREY: IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT IS — WHAT THE — IS 
WHAT YOU READ IN THE PAPER GOING TO INFLUENCE YOUR DECISION IN 
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ANY WAY-1 
MR. GRAY: NO. 
MR. LEATHEROW: NO. 
MR. GODFREY: BOTH OF YOU FEEL LIKE YOU COULD KEEP AN 
OPEN MIND THROUGHOUT THIS PROCEEDING AND LISTEN TO ALL THE 
EVIDENCE^ 
MR. GRAY: YES. 
MR. LEATHEROW: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. NOW, MR. GRAY, DID I CATCH THAT 
YOU HAVE BEEN A VICTIM OF A CRIME IN THE PAST'1 
£4 
HOME. 
MR. GRAY: 
MR. GODFREY: 
MR. GRAY: 
NO, SIR. 
YOU SAID SOMETHING ABOUT A THEFT AT YOUR 
OH, THAT WAS JUST A NEIGHBOR KID RIPPING 
ME OFF SOME TOOLS. HE BROUGHT THEM BACK. 
SO YOU WERE A VICTIM0 
VES. 
OKAY. WAS THE NEIGHBOR KID EVER CHARGED 
MR. GODFREY: 
MR. GRAY: 
MR. GODFREY: 
WITH A CRIME^ 
MR. GRAY: NO. JUVENILE. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. AND THE FACT THAT YOU'VE BEEN 
VICTIMIZED LIKE THAT, DO YOU THINK THAT WOULD INFLUENCE YOUR 
DECISION IN ANY WAY0 
MR. GRAY: NO, SIR. 
MR. GODFREY: YOU WERE INVOLVED IN — MR. GRAY, YOU 
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WERE INVOLVED IN THIS CIVIL JURY EARLIER THIS WEEK, IS THAT 
CORRECT0 
MR. GRAY: YES, SIR. 
MR. GODFREY: WHO RAISED YOUR HANDS0 THOSE THAT WERE 
ON THAT SAME CIVIL JURY AS MR. GRAY, DID ALL OF YOU REACH THE 
SAME DECISION IN THAT CIVIL JURY0 JURY TRIAL0 DID YOU ALL — 
DID ANYBODY — WELL DID ANYBODY REACH AN DIFFERENT DECISION 
THAN THE OTHER JURY MEMBERS0 YOU CAME BACK WITH A VERDICT, 
RIGHT0 WAS IT THE SAME, DID EVERYBODY AGREE ON THE VERDICT0 
EVERYBODY THAT WAS INVOLVED IN THAT TRIAL0 YES OR NO° 
MR. HOLDEN: THE VERDICT WAS NEGOTIATED AT LENGTH. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. DID YOU HAVE TO — DID THE JURY 
THEN HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION IN THAT TRIAL0 WHEN YOU SAY 
NEGOTIATED, DO YOU MEAN — 
MR. HOLDEN: AMONG OURSELVES. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. SO YOU ALL WORKED TOGETHER AT 
ARRIVING AT THAT0 
MR. HOLDEN: VES. 
MR. GODFREY: MR. RICHAN -
MR. RICHAN: YES, SIR. 
MR. GODFREY: — YOU SAID THAT YOU WORKED WITH OFFICER 
MILT GARRETT, IS THAT RIGHT0 
MR. RICHAN: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: WHAT — CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU DID WITH 
HIM-1 
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MR. RICHAN: HE WAS A PACKER, SAME AS I WAS. 
MR. GODFREY: OH, THIS WAS — 
MR. RICHAN: THAT WAS BEFORE — WELL, HE WAS ON THE 
[VOLUNTARY FORCE THEN. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. DID YOU KNOW HIM VERY WELL WHILE 
YOU WERE WORKING WITH HIM? 
MR. RICHAN: I WORKED WITH HIM PROBABLY THREE, FOUR 
YEARS. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK THAT YOUR ASSOCIATION WITH 
HIM WOULD CAUSE YOU TO HAVE ANY BIAS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON 
POLICE OFFICERS' TESTIMONY0 
MR. RICHAN: NO. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK YOU CAN KEEP AN OPEN MIND° 
MR. RICHAN: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK POLICE OFFICERS ARE ALWAYS 
RIGHT0 
MR. RICHAN: NO. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. MR. SMITH, YOU SAID THAT YOU'D 
BEEN ON TWO JURY TRIALS, IS THAT RIGHT0 
MR. SMITH: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: WERE THEY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL0 
MR. SMITH: THEY WERE CIVIL. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. HOW LONG AGO WERE THEV° 
MR. SMITH: LAST WEEK AND ABOUT 20 YEARS AGO. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. DID EITHER OF THOSE TRIALS — OR 
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WHAT WERE THE BASIC FACTS OF THOSE TRIALS, THE ONE LAST WEEK 
AND THEN THE OTHER ONE THAT YOU — 
MR. SMITH: WELL, IT WAS AN ACCIDENT, INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT OR AN ACCIDENTAL SUIT BROUGHT, I GUESS. 
MR. GODFREY: 
MR. SMITH: 
MR. GODFREY: 
MR. SMITH: 
MR. GODFREY: 
MR. SMITH: 
MR. GODFREY: 
ACCIDENT? 
MR. SMITH: 
MR. GODFREY: 
ON — 
MR. SMITH: 
FROM AN AUTOMOBILE. 
MR. GODFREY: 
CRIMINAL? 
MR. SMITH: 
MR. GODFREY: 
OR NOT GUILTY? 
MR. SMITH: 
MR. GODFREY: 
CASE? 
OKAY. THAT WAS THE ONE LAST WEEK? 
UH-HUH. 
WAS THERE A DEATH INVOLVED IN THAT? 
NO. 
WAS THERE AN INJURY? 
YES. 
OKAY. WAS IT A NEGLIGENCE TYPE OF 
YES. 
AND THE OTHER JURY TRIAL THAT YOU'VE BEEN 
IT WAS A — I THINK PARTS OF THEFT 
OKAY. BUT IT WAS A CIVIL TRIAL, NOT A 
YES. I GUESS, YES. 
DID YOU HAVE TO FIND THAT PERSON GUILTY 
YES. 
DO YOU REMEMBER HOW YOU DECIDED IN THAT 
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MR. SMITH: I DON'T QUITE — I THINK IT WAS GUILTY. 
MR. GODFREY: MRS. BYBEE, YOU SAID THAT — YOU 
DESCRIBED FOR THE PROSECUTOR AND ALSO FOR THE COURT A LITTLE 
BIT OF YOUR FEELING OF BEING UNCOMFORTABLE. DO YOU THINK 
THAT'S — IS THE UNCOMFORTABLENESS THAT YOU FEEL BECAUSE YOU 
|ARE A JUROR OR BECAUSE OF JUST WHAT THE EVIDENCE MUST SHOW? 
MRS. BYBEE: MAYBE A LITTLE OF BOTH. 
MR. GODFREY: A LITTLE OF BOTH. BUT DO YOU THINK THAT 
IF YOU WERE CALLED AND SWORN IN AS A JUROR TO HEAR THE CASE 
THAT YOU COULD KEEP AN OPEN MIND AND LISTEN TO ALL THE 
EVIDENCE BEFORE YOU REACHED A DECISION? 
MRS. BYBEE: I THINK SO. 
MR. GODFREY: MR. HADLEY, YOU SAID THAT YOU'VE HAD A 
DAUGHTER KILLED BY A CAR ACCIDENT — 
MR. HADLEY: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: — IS THAT CORRECT? WAS SHE ALSO IN A — 
IN THE CAR? 
MR. HADLEY: NO. SHE WASN'T. SHE WAS WAITING FOR A 
SCHOOL BUS. GOT IN THE ROAD TO SEE IF SHE COULD SEE IT COMING, 
|AND WAS STRUCK BY A CAR. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. WAS THERE CRIMINAL CHARGES BROUGHT 
AGAINST THE DRIVER OF THE CAR? 
MR. HADLEY: NO, THERE WASN'T. 
MR. GODFREY: IT WAS AN ACCIDENT? 
MR. flADLEY: YES. 
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MR. GODFREY: HOW LONG AGO DID THIS HAPPEN? 
MR. HADLEY: A LITTLE LESS THAN TWO YEARS. 
MR. GODFREY: TWO YEARS AGO? 
MR. HADLEY: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK THAT THE DEATH OF YOUR 
DAUGHTER, KNOWING, YOU KNOW, THE REMORSE OR THE GRIEF THAT YOU 
WENT THROUGH AT HER LOSS, DO YOU THINK THAT THAT WOULD SWAY 
YOU IN ANY WAY KNOWING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CHARGED 
WITH KILLING SOMEONE'S SON? 
MR. HADLEY: I DON'T THINK IT WOULD SWAY ME, BUT I — 
I KNOW SOMEWHAT WHAT THEY FELT. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK WHAT THEY FELT WOULD CAUSE 
YOU OR WOULD MAKE YOU MORE INCLINED TO FIND THE DEFENDANT 
GUILTY? 
MR. HADLEY: I THINK THE EVIDENCE IS THE ONLY THING 
THAT, YOU KNOW, IF A PERSON 13 INNOCENT OR GUILTY OR UNLESS 
YOU'RE SAYING THERE'S A CERTAIN DEGREE OF INNOCENCE OR GUILT, 
THEN I — LIKE I SAID, IT HAS TO BE WEIGHED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
MR. GODFREY: SO YOU FEEL YOU COULD LISTEN TO ALL THE 
EVIDENCE BEFORE YOU MADE THAT DECISION? 
MR. HADLEY: YES, I THINK SO. 
MR. GODFREY: AND YOU THINK THAT YOU COULD CONFINE YOUR 
[DECISION TO THE EVIDENCE THAT'S PRESENTED"1 
MR. HADLEY: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. YOU SAID THAT YOU WERE A NEIGHBOR 
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TO OFFICER VANBEEKUM"> 
MR. HftDLEY: I ' M ft NEIGHBOR TO RON VftNBEEKUM, ftND 
THE — THEY SftY I T ' S RUDY THAT'S — 
MR. GODFREY: I S RON ALSO ft POLICE OFFICERS 
MR. HftDLEY: YES, HE I S . 
MR. GODFREY: HOW — WHAT'S YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM'1 
MR. HADLEY: HE JUST — HE LIVES ON THE NEXT BLOCK 
JAND — 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU HAVE ANY SOCIAL ACQUAINTANCE'1 
MR. HADLEY: I HAVE BEEN TO A FEW WARD PARTIES WITH 
|HIM AND THINGS. HIS WIFE HAS PROBLEMS WHEN SHE'S IN ABOUT HER 
SIXTH MONTH OF PREGNANCY, SO THE NEIGHBORHOOD KIND OF HAS TO 
|GET TOGETHER AND HELP HER AND HIM WHILE THEY GET THROUGH THE 
LAST TRIMESTER OR WHATEVER SO — 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK THAT YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH 
HIM WOULD CAUSE YOU ftNY PROBLEM*1 KNOWING THAT HE'S A POLICE 
OFFICER AND THAT THERE WILL BE POLICE OFFICERS TESTIFYING IN 
THIS CASE0 WOULD YOU BE MORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THE POLICE 
IOFF1CERS BECAUSE OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OFFICER VANBEEKUM0 
MR. HADLEY: NO. 
MR. GODFREY: YOU SAID ALSO THftT YOU PARTICIPATED IN A 
IGRAND LARCENY CASES"» 
MR. HADLEY: YES, I DID. 
MR. GODFREY: YOU WERE A JUROR ON THAT0 
MR. HADLEY: YES. 
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MR. GODFREY: DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT YOUR DECISION WAS I N 
THAT CASE0 
MR. HADLEY: YES. WE — THIS WAS JUST ABOUT THE TIME 
THE LAW HAD BEEN CHANGED RAISING THE LIMITS OF PETTY LARCENY, 
AND THERE WASN'T A REAL ARGUMENT ON GUILT, IT WAS MORE ON 
WHETHER OR NOT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A LESSER CHARGE OR — AND 
HE WAS FOUND GUILTY OF GRAND LARCENY. 
MR. GODFREY: THE HIGHER CHARGE, NOT THE LESSER CHARGE-1 
MR. HADLEY: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: NOW, MRS. SHUPE, YOU ALSO SAID THAT YOU 
KNEW RON VANBEEKUM, IS THAT RIGHT0 
MRS. SHUPE: YES, I DO. 
MR. GODFREY: WHAT'S — 
MRS. SHUPE: I HAVEN'T — I HAVEN'T TALKED TO HIM FOR 
PROBABLY' ABOUT TEN YEARS. I DID GROW UP WITH HIM, THOUGH. 
MR. GODFREY: YOU GREW UP WITH HIM"1 
MRS. SHUPE: (MRS. SHUPE NODS.) 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK THAT THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU 
ANY PROBLEMS ON — 
MRS. SHUPE: NO, I — 
MR. GODFREY: — AS FAR AS BEING FAIR OR ANYTHING0 
MRS. SHUPE: I CAN'T SEE ANY. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. DO YOU THINK THAT YOU COULD 
CONFINE YOUR DECISION TO THE EVIDENCE THAT'S PRODUCED AT THE 
TRIAL1 
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MRS. SHUPE: I FEEL LIKE I COULD, YES. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. AND YOU SAID THAT YOU DO DEPOSITS 
FOR THE BILLIARD PARLOR, IS THAT RIGHT? 
MRS. SHUPE: I DID, BUT IT'S BEEN PROBABLY FIVE YEARS 
THAT I'VE WORKED AT THAT BRANCH. 
MR. GODFREY: BUT YOU HAVEN'T HAD ANY CONTACT WITH 
ANYBODY THAT WORKS THERE? 
MRS. SHUPE: NO, I HAVEN'T. 
MR. GODFREY: MRS. MCBRIDE, YOU SAID THAT YOU HAVE FOUR 
ICHILDREN, IS THAT RIGHT? 
MRS. MCBRIDE: YES, SIR. 
MR. GODFREY: ARE THEY — HOW OLD ARE THEY? 
MRS. MCBRIDE: THEY'RE ALL MARRIED. THE YOUNGEST IS 37. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. HAVE YOU — YOU SAID THAT YOU 
DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS CASE? 
MRS. MCBRIDE: I NEVER HEARD OF IT AT ALL. 
MR. GODFREY: YOU HAVEN'T READ ABOUT IT IN THE PAPER? 
MRS. MCBRIDE: IF I HAVE, I CAN'T REMEMBER IT. 
MR. GODFREY: OKAY. MRS. LLOYD, YOU SAID THAT YOU WERE 
IN THE SAME WARD FOR A WHILE WITH CHRIS DAVIS, IS THAT RIGHT? 
MRS. LLOYD: THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. GODFREY: DID YOU — DID YOU HAVE ANY SOCIAL 
CONTACT WITH THE DAVIS FAMILY? 
MRS. LLOYD: OTHER THAN CHURCH MEETINGS, CHRIS WAS IN 
|MY HOME. I HAVE DAUGHTERS HIS AGE, AND THEY WERE FRIENDS. 
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HE'S BEEN IN YOUR HOME? 
YEAH. 
DID YOU EVER TEACH HIM OR ANYTHING OR — 
NO. 
— SUPERVISE HIM IN ANY OF THE CHURCH 
NO. 
OKAY. HOW OLD WAS HE AT THE TIME, DO YOU 
MR. GODFREY: 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. GODFREY: 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. GODFREY: 
FUNCTIONS? 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. GODFREY: 
REMEMBER? 
MRS. LLOYD: WELL, I REMEMBER THAT KAREN WAS A SENIOR 
IN HIGH SCHOOL, KATHERINE WAS A JUNIOR, AND LESLIE WAS A 
SOPHOMORE. AND HE'S IN THERE SOMEWHERE. 
MR. GODFREY: 
MR. DAVIS: 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. DAVIS: 
MR. GODFREY: 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. GODFREY: 
SO — 
IF IT'S ANY CONSOLATION, I WAS A SENIOR. 
OKAY. 
BUT I HAD CONTACT WITH KAREN AND KATHY. 
WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION OF HIM? 
NICE KID. 
DO YOU THINK KNOWING THAT HE'S HERE 
REPRESENTING THE STATE, PARTICIPATING IN REPRESENTING THE 
STATE, DO YOU THINK THAT IN YOUR — YOUR ASSOCIATION WITH HIM, 
DO YOU THINK THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU ANY — OR CAUSE YOU TO BE 
SWAYED TO ONE SIDE OR TO HIS SIDE BASICALLY? 
MRS LLOYD! NO. NO, I GUESS YOU WERE A NICE KID WHEN 
YOU WERE THAT AGE, TOO, BUT IT'S BEEN A LONG TIME SINCE I SAW 
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34 
HIM. I'VE HAD NO PERSONAL CONNECTION WITH HIM FOR A LONG 
TIME. 
HE COULD HAVE CHANGED? 
HE COULD HAVE CHANGED, YEAH. 
I HOPE NOT. 
NOW, YOU SAID THAT YOUR FAMILY HAS — 
SOME OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN IN POLICE OFFICER WORK. ARE ANY 
OF THEM CURRENTLY? 
MRS. LLOYD: NO. MY UNCLES ARE WAY PAST THAT AGE AND 
SO IS MY FATHER-IN-LAW. 
MR. GODFREY: YOUR SON WAS WHEN HE WAS IN THE AIR 
MR. GODFREY: 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. DAVIS: 
MR. GODFREY: 
HE WAS IN THE AIR FORCE. 
BUT HE'S BEEN OUT FOR HOW LONG? 
FIVE YEARS. 
DO YOU SEE ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT? 
NO. 
THE FACT THAT YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN IN LAW 
FORCE, BUT HE' S — 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. GODFREY: 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. GODFREY: 
MRS. LLOYD: 
MR. GODFREY: 
ENFORCEMENT? 
MRS. LLOYD: NO. BECAUSE AS I SAID, MY FATHER-IN-LAW 
WAS THERE BEFORE I EVER GOT MARRIED, AND 30 THAT'S HISTORY. 
ITHAT'S IN THE FAMILY — FAMILY TALKING OCCASIONALLY. AND MY 
UNCLES, I WAS SO YOUNG WHEN THEY WERE IN IT, IT WAS JUST 
ROMANTIC, IF YOU WANT TO CALL IT THAT, THEY HAD UNIFORMS ON. 
I DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. 
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MR. GODFREY: MR. HOLDEN, DID YOU — WHEN YOU WERE A 
POLICE OFFICER, DID YOU EVER ARREST ANYBODY THAT YOU DIDN'T 
THINK WAS GUILTY? 
MR. HOLDEN: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK THAT — DO YOU REALIZE THAT 
THERE ARE TWO SIDES TO EVERY CASE, RIGHT? 
MR. HOLDEN: THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. GODFREY: AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE STATE IS 
THE ONE THAT HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
COMMITTED THIS CRIME? 
MR. HOLDEN: (MR. HOLDEN NODS. ) 
mR. GODFREY: AND YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE STATE DOES 
GET TO GO FIRST WITH THEIR CASE? 
MR. HOLDEN: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: AND DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU CAN — EVEN WITH 
/OUR JOB AS A FORMER POLICE OFFICER AND THE FACT THAT THE 
STATE GETS TO GO FIRST, DO YOU THINK YOU CAN HOLD OFF MAKING A 
DECISION AS TO THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE DEFENDANT UNTIL 
AFTER YOU HEAR ALL OF THE EVIDENCE? 
MR. HOLDEN: I BELIEVE ONE OF THE CHARGES WE RECEIVE 
IS THAT WE WILL NOT CHOOSE OR DECIDE THE CASE UNTIL AFTER, AND 
I BELIEVE I CAN DO THAT, YES. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK YOU CAN BE FAIR? 
MR. HOLDEN: I THINK SO. I SHOULD HOPE SO. 
MR. GODFREY: LET ME TURN TO SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS FOR 
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ALL OF YOU. YOU'VE HEARD ME TALK TO MR. HOLDEN ABOUT THIS, 
YOU REALIZE THAT — ALL OF YOU REALIZE THAT THE STATE DOES 
HAVE THE BURDEN IN THIS CASE, THEY HAVE TO PROVE THAT THE 
(ELEMENTS, EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME, THAT 
THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED OR BEEN CHARGED WITH COMMITTING, 
(HAS OCCURRED, AND DO YOU THINK THAT YOU CAN WAIT UNTIL ALL — 
OR DO ANY OF YOU HAVE A FEELING THAT YOU WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO 
MAKE A DECISION BASED ON ALL THE EVIDENCE? DO ANY OF YOU FEEL 
THAT YOU WOULD BE UNABLE TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND UNTIL YOU'VE 
HEARD THE DEFENDANT'S SIDE OF THE STORY? ANY OF YOU HAVE ANY 
PROBLEMS WITH THAT? DO YOU THINK THAT IF YOU FIND IN THIS 
CASE THAT THE DEFENDANT — OR THAT THE STATE HAS NOT PROVED 
EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT, DO YOU THINK THAT YOU COULD FIND THE 
PDEFENDANT — OR DO ANY OF YOU — EXCUSE ME, LET ME START OVER 
ON THAT QUESTION. IF YOU FIND THAT THE STATE HAS NOT PROVED 
|EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CASE, BUT PERHAPS THEY HAVE 
PROVED SOME OTHER CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED, WOULD ANY OF YOU 
HAVE PROBLEMS IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THE LESSER 
CRIME RATHER THAN THE CRIME THAT HE'S CHARGED WITH? DO YOU 
[THINK, ALL OF YOU THINK THAT YOU COULD DO THAT? 
DO EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU AGREE THAT IF YOU'RE CALLED 
\TO SIT ON THIS JURY THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD TO — HOLD 
THE STATE TO THE STANDARD OF PROVING THE ELEMENTS BEYOND A 
(REASONABLE DOUBT? EVERYBODY'S FAMILIAR WITH THAT STATEMENT, 
RIGHT? BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT 
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THAT MEANS'1 OR HAVE AN IDEA*1 THAT THE STATE — THAT IF THERE 
IS ANY DOUBT IN YOUR MIND AS TO WHETHER THE DEFENDANT IS 
GUILTY, THAT IF THAT DOUBT IS REASONABLE, THAT YOU HAVE TO 
FIND HIM NOT GUILTY71 DO EACH OF YOU THINK THAT IF THE 
EVIDENCE RAISES THAT TYPE OF A DOUBT IN YOUR MIND THAT YOU 
COULD FIND THE DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY'1 
MAYBE THE STATE SHOULD HAVE DONE THIS, PAM, BUT DO YOU 
THINK THAT WE — WE'VE KNOWN EACH OTHER FOR EVER SINCE I'VE 
MOVED INTO THE NEIGHBORHOOD. DO YOU THINK THAT THE 
RELATIONSHIP, SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WE'VE HAD BETWEEN YOUR 
FAMILY AND MY FAMILY WOULD CAUSE YOU ANY PROBLEMS-1 
MRS. CAMPBELL: NO. 
MR. GODFREY: DO YOU THINK YOU COULD BE FAIR AND TO 
LISTEN TO ALL OF THE EVIDENCE^ 
MRS. CAMPBELL: YES. 
MR. GODFREY: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: ARE THERE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS'* 
MR. DAROCZI: IF I MAY, YOUR HONOR, I HAVE A COUPLE 
MORE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. DAROCZI: HAVE ANY OF YOU HAD MAYBE SOME BAD 
EXPERIENCES WITH POLICE, SUCH AS MAYBE A TICKET YOU FEEL YOU 
DIDN'T DESERVE, THAT WOULD — WHERE YOU STILL HAVE A BAD TASTE 
IN YOUR MOUTH ABOUT THAT AND YOU HOLD THAT AGAINST THE POLICE 
HERE IN THIS CASE-1 HOW ABOUT THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. MY 
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OFFICE, HAVE YOU — HAVE ANY OF YOU HAD RUN-INS WITH THE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE OR SOME EXPERIENCE, UNPLEASANT 
EXPERIENCE? I DON'T KNOW, HAVE YOU — AND ALL OF YOU WILL 
[ACCEPT THE LAW, THE JUDGE WILL GIVE YOU THE LAW, WILL READ THE 
LAW TO YOU AT THE END OF THIS CASE THAT YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT. 
jDO ALL OF YOU AGREE THAT YOU WILL ACCEPT THAT LAW AND UPHOLD 
IT AND APPLY IT TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE REGARDLESS OF HOW 
|YOU PERSONALLY FEEL? AND, MRS. CAMPBELL, IF YOU VOTE GUILTY 
IN THIS CASE. WOULD YOU BE EMBARRASSED TO FACE TED AT THE 
NEXT — 
MRS. CAMPBELL: CERTAINLY NOT. 
MR. DAROCZI: — NEXT MEETING? THANK YOU. THAT'S ALL. 
MR. GODFREY: LET ME ASK A SIMILAR QUESTION TO WHAT 
YOU'VE BEEN ASKED BY THE STATE. DO ANY OF YOU THINK THAT THE 
IFACT THAT THE DEFENDANT IS REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER'S OFFICE, THAT THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU PROBLEMS IN 
FINDING HIM NOT GUILTY0 ANYBODY0 
THE COURT: SUPPLY YOUR LIST. 
MR. GODFREY: YOUR HONOR, COULD WE APPROACH THE BENCH0 
THE COURT: YES. 
<WHEREUPON A CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE 
BENCH.) 
MR. DAROCZI: THE STATE PASSES FOR CAUSE, BY THE WAY, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: SUPPLY YOUR LIST. WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN 
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NOW, EACH SIDE GETS TO EXCUSE FOUR OF YOU WITHOUT GIVING ANY 
REASON, THEN THOSE EIGHT WILL LEAVE AND TH OTHER EIGHT WILL BE 
SITTING THERE. THEN THE JUDGE WILL GET AN ALTERNATE JUROR. 
SO THE JURORS THAT ARE STILL SITTING OUT THERE, THERE'S SIX OF 
YOU, HE'LL CALL THREE OF YOU IN JUST A FEW MINUTES, AND 
THEY'LL CHOOSE AN ALTERNATE JUROR. AN ALTERNATE JUROR IS JUST 
A JUROR THAT SITS THROUGH THE TRIAL, AND IF ANYBODY GETS SICK, 
HE TAKES THEIR PLACE. 
MR. DAVIS IS GOING TO CALL THE NAMES OF THE JURORS THAT 
WERE NOT CHALLENGED. IF YOUR NAME IS CALLED, IT MEANS YOU'RE 
GOING TO TRY THE CASE. STAND AND REMAIN STANDING SO THAT WE 
ALL UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER. IF HE DOES NOT CALL YOUR NAME, IT 
MEANS SOMEBODY CHALLENGED YOU AND WE'LL BE EXCUSING YOU IN A 
FEW MINUTES. 
THE CLERK: NUMBER 1 IS ROBERT GRAY. £, LAMAR 
LEATHEROW. 3, ALBERT RICHAN. 4, PAMELA CAMPBELL. 5, RENEEN 
ANDREWS. £, RICHARD HADLEY. 7, NANCY SHUPE. AND EIGHT, DALE 
BAIRD. 
THE COURT: IS THERE ANY QUESTION FROM PLAINTIFF THAT 
THIS IS THE JURY? 
MR. DAROC2I: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: FROM DEFENSE? 
MR. GODFREY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE OTHER EIGHT THAT ARC 
ISEATED MAY GO, BUT THE SIX THAT ARE OUT IN THE AUDIENCE MUST 
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STAY WITH US FOR A FEW MINUTES. SEAT THESE EIGHT. DO NOT 
(SWEAR THEM, BUT SEAT THEM. 
(WHEREUPON AN ALTERNATE JUROR WAS 
SELECTED.) 
OGPENJ._LJIAH ayGySI_JL9J ._i987 2 i@g_Ei ! !k 
THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS COBB, HANK COBB. 
HAVE YOU SEEN THE INFORMATION THAT I WAS PROVIDED WITH? 
MR. GODFREY: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU SAY ABOUT THAT INFORMATION? 
MR. GODFREY: YOUR HONOR, THE ONLY DISPUTE THAT WE HAD 
WITH IT, THAT MR. COBB WANTED ME TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION, 
IS THAT ON THE — IN THE STATEMENT WHERE IT SAYS THAT HE WAS 
PUT ON PROBATION FOR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, DURING THE EIGHT 
MONTHS THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS ON PROBATION, HE WAS ARRESTED 
(THREE SEPARATE TIMES FOR PUBLIC INTOX, TRESPASS, AND ASSAULT. 
MR. COBB DISPUTES THE PUBLIC INTOXICATION ONE. HE, AND I 
RELIEVE THE RECORD INDICATES, THAT THE HARRISVILLE COURT HAD 
NO DISPOSITION, AND I THINK THAT WOULD SUBSTANTIATE HIS 
RECOLLECTION THAT HE HAD THAT HE WAS NOT ARRESTED FOR PUBLIC 
INTOXICATION. BUT OTHER THAN THAT, THE REPORT, WE HAVE NO 
{DISPUTE WITH IT. 
THE COURT: WHAT DOES HE SAY ABOUT THE RESTITUTION 
FIGURES IN THAT REPORT? 
MR. GODFREY: WE'RE NOT GOING TO DISPUTE THAT. 
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THE COURT: DOES THE STATE HAVE ANY COMMENT THEY WISH 
TO MAKE IN THIS MATTERS 
MR. DAINES: OTHER THAN THE CRIME SENTENCES ITSELF, WE 
WOULD SUBMIT IT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DEFENSE HAVE ANYTHING ELSE THEY WANT TO 
SAY"1 
MR. GODFREY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: VERY WELL. THE COURT HERE SENTENCES THE 
DEFENDANT TO SERVE A TERM OF NOT LESS THAN FIVE YEARS AND 
WHICH MAY BE FOR LIFE IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON. THE COURT 
WILL — ON THE MISDEMEANOR CHARGE, THE COURT WILL SENTENCE THE 
DEFENDANT TO SERVE 90 DAYS IN THE COUNTY JAIL. THE COURT WILL 
PROVIDE THAT THE SENTENCE MAY BE SERVED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE 
PRISON SENTENCE HERE PASSED. THE RESTITUTION FIGURE, THE 
COURT ACCEPTS. *6,000 PLUS DOLLARS. 
MR. DAINES: YOUR HONOR, DOES YOUR HONOR NOTE THAT IN 
THE — ON PAGE FOUR OF THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, THERE ARE 
VARIOUS COSTS THERE, AND THEY ADD UP TO MORE THAN *6, 0©O'» 
THEY SAY RESTITUTION IN THIS CASE TOTALS *6,00O. THE 
BREAKDOWN 13 A3 FOLLOWS: AND IT COMES OUT TO *10,739 — 
THE COURT: LET ME SEE MY REPORT. 
MR. DAROCZI: THIS IS THE COURT'S REPORT. THANK YOU, 
YOUR HONOR. I'VE ADDED UP THE FIGURES. THERE'S AN 
ARITHMETICAL MISTAKE THERE. 
MR. GODFREY: ARE ANY OF THE FIGURES INCORRECT^ 
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MR. DAROCZI: PARDON ME? 
MR. GODFREY: ARE ANY OF THE FIGURES INCORRECT? 
MR. DAROCZI: LEAVING OFF THE LAST TWO ITEMS, STILL THE 
FIGURES ADD UP TO OVER *10, 000. 
THE COURT: IS THE ARITHMETIC CORRECT THAT IT'S 
|*10,799.£3? 
MR. DAROCZI: WITH THE LAST TWO ITEMS BEING LEFT OFF, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THE LAST TWO ITEMS WOULD NOT BE — COME 
UNDER THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF RESTITUTION. WHAT DO YOU 
SAY AS TO THAT? 
MR. GODFREY: WE AGREE, YOUR HONOR. WHATEVER ONE AND 
ONE ADDS UP TO, THAT'S WHAT WC LL TAKE AS THE — 
THE COURT: IT'~ OBVIOUSLY OVER SIX. THERE'S ALMOST 
THREE IN THE HOSPITAL AND — AND ALMOST FIVE IN THE MORTUARY. 
MR. GODFREY: WHATEVER THE FIGURE IS, YOUR HONOR, 
WITHOUT THOSE LAST TWO. 
THE COURT: THE COURT SETS RESTITUTION AT *10, 799. £3. 
PURSUANT TO THE CONVERSATION THAT WAS HELD BEFORE, THE COURT 
|WILL START THE SENTENCES THE DATE OF CONVICTION. 
MR. GODFREY: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. DAROCZI: YOUR HONOR, WE'D ASK THAT THE COURT 
IMPOSE A FIVE-YEAR SENTENCE FOR THE USE OF A GUN. 
THE COURT: THE COURT WILL SENTENCE THE — COME BACK. 
THE COURT WILL SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT TO AN ADDITIONAL FIVE 
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YEARS ON THE — 
MR. GODFREY: WELL, YOUR HONOR, WE'D LIKE TO ADDRESS 
THAT. YOUR HONOR HEARD THE TRIAL. AND ON THE ONE TO FIVE 
ENHANCEMENT, WE WOULD ASK YOUR HONOR TO SENTENCE HIM TO LESS 
THAN THE FIVE YEARS, OR LESS THAN THE FIVE-YEAR ENHANCEMENT. 
THE TRIAL INDICATED THAT THERE WERE SOME — THERE WERE SOME 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THIS. MR. COBB WAS UNDER 
SOME STRESSFUL TIME. YOUR HONOR HEARD ALL OF THE EVIDENCE ON 
THAT POINT. THERE WAS ALSO SOME INDICATION THAT — WELL, THE 
EVIDENCE WAS CLEAR THAT MR. COBB DID NOT START THAT FIGHT THAT 
EVIDENTLY ENDED IN MR. — MR. WILSON'S DEATH. WE WOULD ASK 
FOR THAT REASON, YOUR HONOR, THAT FOR THOSE REASONS, THAT YOU 
WOULD IMPOSE LESS THAN THE FIVE YEARS. A3 I UNDERSTAND IT, 
FIVE YEARS IS THE MAXIMUM BASED ON VERY AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND I DON'T THINK THERE ARE ANY IN THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: THE COURT FINDS THAT HE DELIBERATELY 
ARMED HIMSELF FOR JUST SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. THE COURT WILL 
REQUIRE THE FIVE YEARS. 
MR. GODFREY: WELL, IF IT'S ONLY BECAUSE HE HAS A GUN, 
YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK THAT'S REASON ENOUGH UNDER THE 
STATUTE. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE JUST A STRAIGHT FIVE-YEAR 
ENHANCEMENT FOR USE OF A GUN. 
THE COURT: THE COURT NOTES PREVIOUS OFFENSES 
INVOLVING VIOLENCE AND ALSO A USE OF FIREARMS. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING A3 PAGES OF 
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 10TH DAY OF MARCH 1988. 
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